

Financial channels of GLAMs



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The financial survival of many culture organisations has been shaken, and for some shattered, during the COVID pandemic—at a time when organisations were just coming back from the shock of the global financial crisis and the austerity that ensued in many EU member states. To date, the funding situation, and financial channels of GLAMs remains underexplored in cultural policy and cultural economics literature, especially in a European context as most studies on public funding, earned income and fundraising are limited to the US and UK. Based on a literature review, a policy mapping across the EU-27 member states and the result of the GLAMMONS survey that contained several items on the financial situation of GLAMs, this working paper discusses cultural policy changes after the pandemic and the specific changes with the funding of GLAMs and shifts in their financial structure. The aim of this working paper is to gain a broader understanding of the field and getting deeper insights into the challenges that GLAMs faced before the COVID-19 pandemic and after it.

The main findings can be summarized as:

- Since the financial crisis there are massive shifts in the funding situation of GLAMs. The decline of public funds was mainly replaced with private grants and earned income.
- The COVID-19 pandemic created again massive decline in income, contributions, and public funding yet most organisation could be stabilized through governmental rescue packages.
- Alternative fundings are still used not much. When new funding instruments are discussed then usually market-based solutions are discussed, community-based financing is not an issue yet in cultural policy debates.
- Massive data gaps in relation to:
 - o GLAMs in general. While museums and libraries are fairly well-researched, galleries and archives are not. Most research covers big organisations; less is known about the situation of small and mid-sized organisations.
 - o Funding situation of GLAMs within and across different GLAM sectors. For example, on archives, there is hardly any available data.
 - o Spatial differences and inequalities between core and non-core regions and the support of GLAM with capital regions most often getting the most private contributions.

- There is little knowledge of donations and civil society support of culture through voluntary work or donations on the local level.

While the findings of the Survey are not representative and only preliminary with a partial exploration of the research topics, they give indications for our shared research on GLAMMONS and can be considered a good starting point for future investigations.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACRONYM	DESCRIPTION
WP	Work Package

1. Introduction

With two major economic crises in less than fifteen years, the cultural sector in the European Union has been under a lot of pressure. After the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, many municipal and regional local authorities have had difficulties developing efficient ways of financing cultural heritage (Bonet & Donato, 2011; Rubio-Arostegui & Villarroya, 2022). Since the COVID-19 pandemic and massive governmental support packages, there is an additional need to strengthen the sector’s financial resilience as public fundings are expected to decrease over the next decade after governments had widely adopted countermeasures and provide emergency funding during the pandemic (Anheier et al., 2021; Betzler et al., 2020; for a detailed overview across EU member states, see Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023b; Hylland et al., 2022).

In the framework of the GLAMMONS research project we are interested in the post-pandemic experiences and practices of galleries, libraries, archives, and museums. In using the new umbrella term ‘GLAM’ for these institutions¹ we underline that “GLAM is a cross-institutional field which seeks to find points of commonality among various cultural-heritage institutions, while still recognising their points of difference.” (Davis & Howard, 2013, p. 15). What these institutions share is that they are collecting institutions—art, records, books, documents, or objects. However, “what they do with that collection is what distinguishes the role of each institution in the cultural-heritage sector” (Davis & Howard, 2013, p. 17). Most GLAMs rely to varying degrees on public funding with subsidies and grants allocated by a public authority. While many institutions in this field are state-owned, there are many archives, museums or galleries that are community-run or community-owned (Popple et al., 2020).

For GLAMs as well as the culture and creative industries (CCI) more broadly “systematic knowledge of new forms of financing in the CCI is limited...” (Loots et al., 2022, p. 209). Moreover, the fiscal aspects of cultural policy have been neglected in the literature, mainly because of a “lack of detailed, systematic, cross-domain (e.g., theatre, museums), cross-level (e.g., state, province, municipality) and cross-time data” (Katz-Gerro, 2015, p. 1) for public spending as well as new forms of financing culture. Several research projects within the EU research frameworks have started to elaborate aspects of new funding for cultural heritage organisations (see, e.g., CLIC). In line with recent EU reports the notion of *complementary funding* instead of *alternative funding* is used in this report, “to highlight how these instruments are not envisaged to substitute but rather to complement public financial support where applicable” (European Commission, 2021a, p. 2)

¹ As Sanderhoff (2014b, p. 23) highlights, in the European Union the “concept of GLAM has been consolidated via digital initiatives such as Europeana, the EU Commission’s joint portal to European digitised libraries, archives, and museums.”

The working paper will discuss two broader topics: a.) the cultural policy changes after the pandemic and b.) the specific changes with the funding of GLAMs and shifts in their financial structure. The aim of this working paper is to gain a broader understanding of the field and getting deeper insights into the state-of-the-art in the research literature. Based on this review, the working paper will give an overview of complementary fundings in operation as well as those that might be implemented in the public and private sector in GLAMS across the EU. This review provides the basis for further research into commons-relevant financial instruments as well as on commons-based alternative finances in year two of WP 2.

1.1. Purpose and Scope

The motivation behind this state-of-the-art review is driven by three research interests:

- First, it aims to understand whether economic crises and external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic have led to substantial changes in the financial structure of GLAMs. → **Research question: How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the financial structure of GLAMs?**
- Second, it aims to understand if there were changes in the financial structure of GLAMs, and whether those led to structural changes in the organisations, such as new funding programs or decision-making processes in the GLAMs. → **Research question: How can financial structures initiate change in GLAMs?**
- And third, it aims to understand if financial practices enable commoning strategies within existing cultural institutions that are about reclaiming public cultural institutions (and not markets) for social uses and communal shareholding. → **Research question: How can financial practices of GLAMs facilitate commoning?**

The study's specific objectives are as follows:

- To identify the different types of alternative and innovative funding mechanisms in operation as well as those that might be implemented in the public and private sector in GLAMS across the EU.
- To identify those alternative and innovative funding mechanisms that open up commoning practices in GLAMS.
- To map cultural policy changes since the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the overall design of the GLAMMONS research project, this research will put forward conclusions on the different funding mechanisms that exist in GLAMs and that have changed through the COVID-19 pandemic.

It will provide recommendations on what complementary funding mechanisms might be best to facilitate and promote commoning practices in the sector. However, while acknowledging that distinctions between the

various organisations are likely and that all the member countries cannot be studied in detail in this research context.

1.2. Contribution to other Deliverables

While there is a rising debate on cultural commons as cultural artefacts and resources that are produced, sustained, and managed in a commons-like framework, there is little systematic knowledge on *how cultural commons are financially sustained and what financing practices sustain commoning practices*. The aim of this work package is to broaden the evidence base, and thus prepare the empirical research in the second year that will focus on commoning practices through funding in various GLAMs. The aim of Task 2.1. in work package 2 will be to develop in-depth case studies on commoning practices in GLAMs with a specific focus on emerging financing practices for GLAMs under commons.

The pan-European mapping from work task 1.2 and the survey from work task 1.1. within the first project year will help to identify already existing financing practices and models that can be characterized as commons-oriented or that are currently developed into relevant finance models and organisations for GLAMs under commons. While we compare across EU member states and collect evidence on new financing practices (new approaches, instruments, and examples etc.), this will also help with identifying information-rich cases for in-depth research. It is our aim to research three in-depth case studies to interrogate changes towards commons-based practices for GLAMs and to specifically gain a better understanding of financing practices in these commoning initiatives.

1.3. Structure of the Document

The working paper is divided into seven sections. After the introduction, chapter 2 introduces the methodology of the research. Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of public funding models for GLAMs and discusses the different types of funding that make up the contemporary mixed funding situation of GLAMs and the changes in cultural funding across the EU member states since the economic and financial crisis of 2007-2008. Chapter four focuses on contemporary changes and challenges for GLAMs—most importantly through the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences for the funding of GLAMs.

Chapter five elaborates on new complementary and alternative funding instruments that could support GLAMs after the shock of the pandemic and potential budget cuts. Chapter six presents the results of the GLAMMONS survey and chapter seven concludes with a discussion on the consequences of this review and the results of the survey for the qualitative research that follows in the second year of the GLAMMONS project.

2. Methodology

The working paper is based on bibliographical research and the descriptive results of the GLAMMONS survey, it summarises the results of WP 1.2. of the GLAMMONS project. This approach was motivated by the desire to gain a broader understanding of the research field and deeper insights into the state-of-the-art in the research literature to answer the research questions (see 1.1). The main aim was to map the current state of cultural policies in all member states to identify potential changes through the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic in relation to financial practices of GLAMs and to identify new financial instruments that have emerged in cultural funding that might provide additional sources of funding for GLAMS in the future and open up commoning practices in GLAMS.

One of the key challenges with this review lies in accessing comparable data on the financial flows of GLAMs across the 27 member states in the European Union. The difficulties of the comparability of cultural statistics across the EU member states are well-known (Dent et al., 2020; KEA, 2015) and the harmonization of cultural data on the European level is subject of specific working groups for more than a decade (BÍNA et al., 2012). The existing data on public spending on culture is scattered by countries, and comparative analysis with updated data is limited (Almeda et al., 2018; Inkei, 2019). While data on public finances of GLAMS exist for some governmental levels, there is a complete absence of data on alternative and complementary funding—despite the observation of an increasing “mixed funding economy” (Čopič et al., 2013; Greer, 2021) for publicly funded cultural organisations over the past 20 years where public support (direct and indirect) is combined with private support (business support, individual giving, foundations, and trusts) and earned income as the three main sources of the financing of culture in Europe. Nevertheless, this lack of data becomes more apparent when working on a specific topic such as GLAMs - which is becoming a new conceptual term for cultural memory institutions in the cultural sector but is not well represented in statistical data yet. Thus, in most EU-27 countries, usually data on some of the four GLAM sectors are missing. While most countries have a good overview of their museums and libraries, there is less information on the number of archives and galleries. For example, while EGMUS (2022) presents an overview on museums in the EU-27, there is no such initiative on the EU-level for archives, galleries, or libraries to enable statistical comparability on GLAMs. Particularly striking is the lack of data on archives and galleries. Often, galleries are subsumed under museums as archives are under libraries.

This report shows there are considerable data gaps on how many organizations exist, their legal form or finance models, this makes it difficult to understand the changes across GLAMs in the last decades. To gain a better understanding of the existing mixed funding economy for GLAMs in the EU member states the working paper relies on literature

reviews and the indicative information given in a survey that was conducted within the first year of the GLAMMONS research project. The survey entailed several questions that focus on the diversity of income streams for GLAMs and asked whether significant changes happened since the COVID-19 pandemic.

The following data collection methods are employed:

- Desk Research–Data on the cultural policy funding as well as the changes in cultural policy was gathered by secondary sources in the form of published research, online and offline research, including websites, different types of public databases on cultural policy and funding and other sources across all 27 EU member states. We also made use of secondary data analysis including statistical data bases on cultural funding in the European Union. Used databases include: The Compendium of Cultural Policies (Council of Europe 2016) and its comparative overview of financial measures during the COVID-19 pandemic in member states of the EU as well as EUROSTAT data on public spending_on ‘recreation, culture and religion’ and ‘cultural service’ (EUROSTAT, 2022).
- For the survey, the primary data collection tool was an online survey form with Zoho. The online questionnaire entailed a battery of nine questions to GLAMS to better understand their funding situation, assets, costs, and changes during the pandemic. While online surveys can give a broader overview of trends in a sector, they also have severe limitations. The response rate is usually low and the person answering might not have deeper knowledge of all fields in a cultural organisation and some institutions may not share critical information on funding/financing mechanisms. A similar risk exists with desk research where it might not always be easy to ascertain how up to date the information is if the websites are not regularly updated.

The preliminary results of this research will be substantiated with in-depth case studies in the second year of the GLAMMONS project. This qualitative approach seems the most suitable to gather information-rich cases that provide novel insights into contemporary developments in the GLAM sector. And which will help to give the various organisations and their differences in terms of needs and funding practices in the GLAM sector more visibility.

3. Traditional models of public support for GLAM

As heritage institutions GLAMs have always received special attention in cultural policies and wide public support across different governmental levels (Bell & Oakley, 2014; McGuigan, 2004). They also play a huge role in cultural policy making in the European Union with the first-ever European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage recently introduced in 2018 (European Commission, 2019). For the public support of arts and culture various models can be differentiated worldwide (Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989). Within the cultural policy literature usually three main models of public support are identified, at least within the cultural policies studies in the Global North (Dubois, 2015; Nogare & Bertacchini, 2015; Van der Ploeg, 2006; Vicente et al., 2012):

The continental **European model** is state driven characterised by a high degree of government involvement in the public production of cultural services through publicly owned cultural institutions and a strongly centralised administrative system with France and Italy as serving prime examples. An exceptional case is Germany that due to its federalism has almost no federal cultural policy and delegates most of the making and funding of cultural policy to the Länder and the municipalities.

Secondly, in the **British model**, government intervention is relatively low and aims to promote culture at an arm's length and funding from private contributors such as private firms, individuals, and foundations is actively promoted and supported by public authorities (Tobelem, 2013). The **arms-length approach** can be found in the UK, Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Whereas the UK works with an independent Arts Council and no ministerial responsibility, the Netherlands has a model with an independent Arts Council and ministerial responsibility. In the latter case the Arts Council recommends, but the Minister of Culture decides and is held responsible by the parliament.

And, thirdly, there is the **American model** in which cultural institutions are mostly private entities with low or no direct government support. Instead, indirect support measures such as tax breaks serve to foster private contributions to the arts and culture and organisation are encouraged to earn income (Romolini et al., 2020; Rosenstein, 2010; Toepler, 2013; Toepler & Dewees, 2005).

In terms of the cultural policy systems in the EU-27 member states, most member states mix aspects from all three ideal models (see overview in table 1).

We find highly centralized cultural policy systems with a ministry of culture that bears responsibility for defining and implementing cultural policy (e.g., France and the eastern European EU member states) towards more decentralized systems where the responsibility is distributed across several government levels (with Italy having four layers of government responsible for culture). Most countries have gone through a

decentralization process devolving responsibilities on regional and local governments levels in the last decades with the local level gaining significantly more spending power in comparison with central governments (e.g., in). Moreover, the majority of member states now makes use of an arm's length body to distribute cultural funding for arts and cultural projects. Also, many underwent a horizontal decentralization process and privatized their cultural institutions going more in direction of the American model.

Country	Cultural Policy System	Cultural spending total in Million Euro	Central Government in Million Euro	Regional Government in Million Euro	Local Government in Million Euro
Austria	Highly decentralised system with cultural competences across with state, regional and local level	3100,21	1117,02	1195,25	787,94 (without Vienna)
Belgium	Highly decentralised system in three communities / regions, and strong municipalities	2393,8	180	1080,8	1273,3
Bulgaria	Decentralised system with strong municipalities,	329,9	148	N/A	193,6
Croatia	Highly centralised with strong ministry but also municipalities	396,3	119,1	N/A	277,2
Cyprus	Centralised in the Ministry of Education and Culture, state has responsibility for culture	48,2	37,1	N/A	11,1
Czech Republic	Decentralization and the re-allocation of public responsibilities since 1990s but still centralised	1461,2	540	967,1 (regional and local combined)	
Denmark	Mixed model with Ministry of culture + The Danish Art Foundation + shared responsibilities with municipalities	2041,7	886,6	N/A	1.264,8
Estonia	Centralised with Ministry of Culture + Estonian Cultural Endowment + shared responsibilities with municipalities	273,8	152,7	N/A	129,0
Finland	Mixed model with Ministry of culture + Finnish Cultural Foundation + shared responsibilities with municipalities	1349	816	N/A	780

France	Highly centralised with ministry of culture + shared responsibilities with municipalities and regions	18000	6464	No data available	11915
Germany	Decentralised, cultural competence with federal states and municipalities	15486	3 246,3	5 597,0	5 667,9
Greece	Mixed cultural policy model with strong ministry + arm's length bodies + shared responsibilities with regional and local government	311	163	N/A	148
Hungary	Horizontally distributed competences across several ministries, no ministry of culture, no regional level but municipalities have responsibilities	1562	1263,4	N/A	467,9
Ireland	Mixed model with ministry + Arts Council + shared responsibilities with municipalities	814,9	341,7	N/A	482,6
Italy	Centralised with strong state and ministry of culture but shared responsibilities across four levels of government - state, regions, provinces, and municipalities	5036	2691	No data available	2708
Latvia	Mixed model with ministry of Culture + arm's length body + shared responsibilities with municipalities	347,1	204,2	N/A	170,9
Lithuania	Centralised with strong state and ministry of culture but municipalities can have cultural policies	396,9	207,2	N/A	189,7
Luxembourg	Centralised with Ministry of Culture + shared responsibilities with municipalities	362,4	230,8	N/A	174,5
Malta	Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government + Horizontally distributed competences across several ministries,	127,6	124,5	N/A	3,1
Netherlands	Decentralised model with shared responsibilities across state, regions and municipalities + arm's length body for arts funding	4213	1680	No data available	2696

Poland	Centralised with Ministry of Culture + shared responsibilities with municipalities	3280,8	877,8	No data available	2494,3
Portugal	Centralised with Ministry of Culture + shared responsibilities with municipalities	664,8	246,9	N/A	417,7
Romania	Mixed model with ministry of culture + National Cultural Fund (ANCF) + shared responsibilities with municipalities	796,8	161,5	N/A	635,3
Slovakia	Mixed model with ministry of culture + shared responsibilities with regions and municipalities	475,8	382,8	No data available	255,5
Slovenia	Centralised with Ministry of Culture + shared responsibilities with municipalities	367,2	201	N/A	213,3
Spain	Mixed model with ministry of culture + shared responsibilities with regions and municipalities	5476	5476	No data available	3267
Sweden	Mixed model with ministry of culture + Swedish Arts Council + shared responsibilities with regions and municipalities	3074	1425,8	N/A	1942

Table 1: Overview cultural policy systems and cultural spending across different levels of government, Data taken from Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends (2023) and EUROSTAT (2022) for 2021; bold highlight indicates most important policy level according to funding.

Within the continental European model three basic systems of allocating subsidies can be differentiated (Ploeg, 2005): through centralized administration (as in France, Italy, several Central and Eastern European states); as the distribution of governmental funds to a series of organisations with a high degree of autonomy in using them (in some Scandinavian states) and a system of distribution of governmental financing, on the basis of the consultancy provided to the Government by an independent artistic council (The Netherlands).² The direct governmental funding differs from one member state to another, depending on the objectives of their cultural policies (for an overview see, e.g., Klamer et al., 2006, p. 8; Manda et al., 2017, pp. 180-181). The governmental financing means may be both direct (primarily on

² Srakar et al. (2018) and Srakar and Vecco (2021) recently argued for more nuanced European typologies and suggest on their indicator set to differentiate: Eastern European group: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania; (2) Mediterranean group: Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal; (3) Western European (Liberal/Social-Democratic/Continental) group: The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Ireland, UK, Denmark, Finland, Sweden; (4) Outliers: Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Estonia, Slovenia, France, Belgium.

supporting cultural infrastructure and production (i.e., cultural supply) and indirect (tax incentives).

It is important to acknowledge that public funding to culture does not come from Ministries of Culture exclusively. In some countries, there is a vast range of different Ministries and governmental programs in education, civic participation, well-being, physical and mental health, regeneration that concur with the Ministry of Culture in supporting culture (see Jakonen & Sokka, 2022 for a detailed discussion of Finland and cultural policy as a public policy through the different governmental policy domains). These **implicit cultural policies** (Ahearne, 2009) describe a wide set of public decisions and programmes which have cultural impacts even if they are not conceived and presented as pursuing cultural goals. In 2021 in France, for example, the amount of expenditure on culture by other ministries is estimated at EUR 4.4 billion. Around 60% of this comes from the Ministry of Education, with the remainder coming from a wide range of ministries including the Ministry for Higher Education, Research and Innovation, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry for Agriculture and Food and the Ministry of Justice. Overall, the combined public expenditure on culture from other Ministries slightly exceeded that of the Ministry of Culture itself every year since 2017 (Ministère de la Culture, 2021). For example, in Germany the international cultural policy budget takes the biggest share with more than 21% of the overall national budget for culture. Responsibility, however, sits with the Foreign Ministry (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2022, p. 23).

Moreover, important sources of financing for culture are provided from external funds through grants obtained from the European Union or the World Bank and the Lottery. Also, EU's structural funds have become important in supporting arts and culture. Their aim is to reduce regional disparities in development and strengthen cohesion and cultural diversity. Especially Eastern European countries make use of structural funds to improve public access to culture and the arts, and this practice seems to be little affected by the economic crisis (Čopič et al., 2013, p. 56). Finland makes use of the European Agricultural Fund for a variety of cultural projects and support (see, e.g., Pekkala, 2012). Cultural organisations are also eligible for interregional cooperation projects funded through the EU's INTERREG programme and the EU Horizon. And again, this type of funding occurs outside the agenda of the Ministry of Culture in the relevant country.

Today the boundaries between the three ideal-type models have become blurred. For example many museums have started to implement a mixed model leading to a hybrid museum funding structure in Europe that combines public funding, private contributions, and self-generated income (Camarero et al., 2011; Frey & Meier, 2006; Lindqvist, 2012; Loots et al., 2022; Romolini et al., 2020). This **mixed funding economy** brings together the three main sources of the financing of culture in Europe (see Manda et al., 2017, p. 180): public support (direct and indirect), private support (business support,

individual giving, foundations, and trusts) and earned income. However, based on our mapping we could not identify this mixed funding economy despite many member states having strong policy objectives for enabling private funding. As there is data available on public funding, for some countries even detailed after sectors, there are only a few countries (e.g., Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden) making the effort to document developments for private funding. Yet not all do so regularly or differentiate for different types of private funding such as grants from private foundations or donations. Italy seems an exception, as it monitors donations and private giving through its different tax incentive schemes and can trace how much people are donate and, thus, the success of certain new mechanisms such as *Art Bonus* (The Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023). For earned income of cultural organisation, there exist no overview yet and there is no data available.

3.1 Overview of different fundings in mixed funding economy

Despite a strong tradition of public support for arts and culture in the EU-27 member states, the funding sources for arts and cultural organisation have become increasingly mixed over the last decades, not least because public authorities have encouraged cultural institutions to diversify their sources of income and implemented favourable tax regimes to encourage private contributions and created vehicles for financial capital investments (Klamer et al., 2006; Manda et al., 2017; OECD, 2022).

However, there is only little research despite its importance for cultural organisations and policymakers. Moreover, there is only limited information available on the relative importance of these different revenue streams in GLAMS operations. Moreover, little is known on funding sources within specific sectors of the GLAMS (galleries, libraries, archives museums), across these sectors and different types of GLAMS (public, private, non-profits), and within different spatial contexts (urban, small, and medium-sized cities and rural areas). The following section will provide a brief overview of the different financial instruments and main funding mechanisms in current cultural policies debates.

3.1.1. Public Funding

Subsidies

Subsidies come from those bodies with a statutory responsibility to support culture, this is often done with direct support in the form of non-repayable,

guaranteed fixed allocations for cultural institutions. Usually national cultural ministries or the arts funding bodies provide these lump sums as a direct support to cultural organisations (Klamer et al., 2006). For most of the EU member states, public authorities (at European, national, regional, and local level) are still the main funding source for GLAMs (European Commission, 2021a). An indirect form of governmental support are tax incentives that have become more important over the last decades.³ They usually come in three forms (OECD, 2022, p. 235):

- As specific tax credits targeted towards specific sectors and products, as for example, with reduced VAT rates for arts sales, books or eBooks in many EU member states (Hickley, 2023) or with tax incentives for movie productions (Castendyk, 2018).
- As tax reliefs for individuals and corporations given for charitable donations to cultural organisations. For example, Italy introduced with *Art Bonus* a tax credit that is equal to 65 percent of charitable contributions that individuals, non-profit organisations and businesses make in favour of public cultural heritage (Donelli et al., 2022).
- As tax credits that may be used for wider policy goals, such as support to SMEs or innovation in the wider cultural and creative industries (Loots et al., 2022; TFCC, 2015).

While data on subsidies is easily collected from governmental household data, indirect government support is hard to account for as it represents a loss in tax revenue to the government.

Grants

Grants are a form of direct financial assistance to individual artists and cultural organisations from public or other national and international sources that often must be applied for in a competitive manner, are assessed through a peer-review process and do not have to be paid back. Next to the different tiers of governments (national, regional, local), many organisations provide grants to cultural heritage organisations, for example, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, UNESCO, World Bank, Lotteries, national cultural organisations (e.g., Goethe-Institute) or other national ministries that have cultural funding available (e.g., in Germany the Foreign Ministry that funds Goethe-Institute and is responsible for foreign cultural policy). In the European Union grants are the main funding mechanism and distributed through the trans-national programs such as Creative Europe: Culture, Creative Europe: Media, Erasmus Plus, Europe for Citizens and Horizon 2020 (for an overview see European Commission, 2021b; FINPIEMONTE, 2021, p. 10). Creative Europe is

³ Several EU-funded research projects have dealt with the increasing role of tax incentives and fiscal policy in cultural policy and for Culture and Creative Industries support. See “Creative Clash” (2009-2013), “Connecting Arts & Business” (2013-2015) and “Cultural and creative spillovers in Europe” (2015-2017) and for cultural heritage the Interreg “ForHeritage project: Excellence in heritage management in central Europe” (2014-2020).

the European Commission's framework program to support the culture and audio-visual sectors. The Creative Europe programs 2021-2027 has a budget of € 2.44 billion, compared to €1.47 billion of the previous programs (2014-2020). However, for grants often only non-profit organisations are eligible and not necessarily individual artists - there are only a few funds made accessible for individuals (e.g., the Capital culture fund of the German Office of Culture for individual artists projects). Especially for smaller organisations, navigating the EU grant proposal rules is very challenging as recently acknowledged by the European Parliament (2022). Next to public organisations there are many non-profit arts foundations that also issue grants and can be applied for. A specific role has been taken up by state lotteries in many countries, where they have become a main giver of grants for capital investments and local cultural development, often supporting arts forms and cultural engagement that cultural policy budgets do not cover (Čopič et al., 2013). For cultural heritage organisations lotteries have become a crucial financial source with their capital investments schemes to conduct necessary maintenance on buildings (Klamer et al., 2013; Pickerill, 2021).

3.1.2. Private Contributions

While state support for arts and culture in the form of cultural policies is a 20th century phenomenon, private contributions in arts and culture exist as long as there was support through the church or court (Bremner, 1994). Fundraising, as the strategic activity of seeking charitable, mostly nongovernmental private support, has become more important in the last decades for GLAMs to compensate for the decline of public funding (Camarero et al., 2023; Massi et al., 2019). Those private contributions in cultural funding can be distinguished between the two extreme poles of sponsorship and charity. While *sponsorship* functions as a marketing tool, in the service of publicity, of branding a firm, its products or services, *charity* or patronage takes the form of gifts or donations, most often of money, but also of support in kind, including one's time and skills, in case of volunteers. As Massi et al. (2019, p. 409) explain, a "gradual evolution of fundraising from an elitist and individual activity, which has been, for many years, a prerogative of few wealthy people (i.e., mecenatism and patronage), to a participated and more democratic process in which anyone can contribute (i.e., crowdfunding)" can be observed. Despite the raised importance of private contributions, most EU member states do not collect data on private contributions and not all have yet established legal frameworks for tax incentives for individuals and companies for donations (see Figure 1, p.18).

Sponsorship

Sponsorship "is defined by many scholars as a marketing tool used by companies to associate with the image of a sponsored entity for

commercial purposes, providing financial support to this entity in return” (Lewandowska, 2015, p. 35). Thus, sponsorship “excludes corporate giving, philanthropy, and patronage on the basis that these have no intention to exploit brand association.” (Lund, 2010, p. 114). Since the 1970s and 1980s corporate sponsorship has become more important for cultural organisation in Europe with many now being dependent on corporate partners (Sauvanet, 1999; Seaman, 2013). Increasingly sponsorship transitions into cross-sector collaborations (Wang & Holznagel, 2021) and becomes more than marketing. For example, Lewandowska (2015, p. 46) finds that partnerships have a much more significant effect on building positive external and internal relationships for companies than just arts sponsorships. Lund (Lund, 2010) shows how sponsorship relationships can turn into long-term value co-creation with sponsors where resources are combined, knowledge is shared, and the partnership evolves through collaborative experiences.

This “corporate cultural engagement” (Labaronne, 2023) has now proliferated across the arts and cultural sector and has become part of companies’ broader social objectives in “corporate citizenship” (Schwaiger et al., 2010) where companies expect to influence the shaping of the project or program (e.g., corporation like blockbuster exhibitions with wide audience appeal. As a cultural heritage organisation, GLAMs are attractive for sponsorship arrangements (Seaman, 2013). However, in contrast, GLAMs have also come under much public pressure and protest when working together with unethical corporations (Serafini & Garrard, 2019)

Donations

Donations refer to financial support from a business, a foundation or an individual that is made as a gift with no contractual obligation to donate. An exemption are trusts and foundations who differ from private companies in that they exist to fund projects that match their objectives and place their donations accordingly. Encouraging private and corporate donations has been a focus for policymakers over the last decade. However, several patterns have been observed that dampen policymakers hopes for wider use of donations in the cultural sector. For example, for Italy, Gianecchini (2020, p. 308) finds for corporate giving that:

- Smaller companies are more likely to contribute to the maintenance of the artistic heritage of the local area where they are located, with the aim of sustaining the cultural capital of their community (local legacy strategy);
- Larger companies are more likely to support arts and culture as part of their social responsibility strategy (rich patronage strategy); and
- Medium-sized service companies are more likely to contribute a small amount of money to cultural and artistic events with a national appeal, with the aim of enhancing their reputation (market-oriented strategy).

The Arts Council UK reports that organisations that operate an accessible building generate a larger volume of private investment – and income overall – than those not operating a venue (ACE, 2022, p. 6) Also music, theatre and visual arts were preferred sectors for giving while heritage organisations only received 8 percent of the total amount. Location still plays an important role as most of the private contributions went to large organisations in London.⁴ The dataset also shows significant changes during the COVID pandemic. For example, giving from trust & foundations (-5%) and corporations (-7%) went down while individual giving went up (+6%). In Italy and Spain banking foundations play a huge role in cultural funding but in both countries their contributions have significantly go down since the financial crisis. For Spain the decline is at 25 percent, while in Italy the banking foundations’ support for the sector fell by 47%, from €413 million in 2010 to €220 million in 2020 (see country profiles in Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023c). Thus, raising donations during a crisis proves more difficult and puts additional strain on GLAMs funding situation.

Patronage

Historically patrons were individuals who took over several roles: “mentors, sponsors, and agents for the artists they took under their protection” (Garber, 2008, p. 3). Most often artist even lived in their patron’s households. In the 21st century “contemporary patronage networks increasingly include not only collectors but also gallerists, who perform a number of the financially sustaining and personally inspiring roles that were fulfilled in earlier years by the individual patron.” (Garber, 2008, p. 13).⁵ Furthermore, most wealthy individuals use their own foundations for charitable giving (Cobb, 2002, p. 126). Patronage differs from donations in that patrons want to engage more than just give money or time. Patronage finds its contemporary equivalent in *venture philanthropy* where funders help organisations in capacity-building instead of supporting innovation (Cobb, 2002) but also in *crowd-patronage* (Swords, 2017) on platforms like Patreon where patrons can support artists through a monthly payment. Another form are the many *Friends’ associations and societies* that GLAMs often have and where ‘friends’ pay annual membership fee and contribute significantly to private contributions.

⁴ Companies usually donate for established art forms that are already well funded. This effect is well-known as ‘crowding in’ whereby governmental funding signals quality and will result in higher private contributions (Camarero et al., 2023).

⁵ Sacco (2016, p. 9) distinguishes different types of patronage: Classical patronage (Roman patronage with an emphasis on human cultivation and balance), Strategic patronage (created by the mediaeval church and perfected by Renaissance princes. It implies a shift from cultivation to strategic power, without going through a market, by creating influence and soft power), Public patronage (public policy – typical for museums), Committed patronage (individual patronage like the avant-garde or the American art collector Peggy Guggenheim), Civic patronage (based on society) and Entrepreneurial patronage (entrepreneurs and patrons of the arts who want to build a certain image of themselves).

Country	Data Collection	Tax Framework for donations to non-profit organisations
Austria	No data collection	Yes, since 2015 (for corporations) and 2016 (individuals)
Belgium	Commissioned studies	No
Bulgaria	No information available	No information available
Croatia	No data collection	Yes, but not for individuals
Cyprus	No information available	No information available
Czech Republic	Yes	No
Denmark	No data collection	Yes
Estonia	Partial through tax data	Yes
Finland	No data collection	Yes, but not for individuals
France	Biannual Survey	Yes
Germany	Partial through tax data	Yes
Greece	No data collection	Yes
Hungary	No data collection	Yes
Ireland	Yes	Yes, but not for individuals
Italy	Yes	Yes
Latvia	No data collection	Yes
Lithuania	Yes	Yes
Luxembourg	No data collection	Yes
Malta	No data collection	Yes
Netherlands	No data collection	Yes
Poland	No data collection	Yes
Portugal	No information available	Yes
Romania	No data collection	Yes
Slovakia	No information available	No information available
Slovenia	No data collection	Yes
Spain	No data collection	Yes
Sweden	No data collection	Yes, up to 1500 Swedish krona (SEK)

Table 2: Overview of data collection on private contributions and existing tax incentives for donations, data based on Country Profiles in Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends

3.1.3. Earned Income

Earned income denotes all direct income made by cultural organisations on the market from their business operations. Most cultural organisations self-generate revenues from entrance fees, bookshops and retail sales, space rental, cafés and restaurants and donations and sponsorships. They might also hire their venues for meetings, weddings, or events to provide. And many increasingly participate in special events such as museum lates or behind the scenes tours. Another source of income might be publishing rights and reproduction licenses for artworks. For a limited number of museums, franchising has become another source of income, as in the case

of the Louvre in Abu Dhabi and the Pompidou Centre’s partnerships in Malaga, Spain and Brussels, Belgium (Pauget et al., 2021).

What organisations do with their earned income might differ – for example, the Tate Modern in London uses their entrance fees solely to purchase new art⁶. Others, like libraries or archives often transfer their earned income to the parent organisation, usually a public authority or a university as they are still governed through the ministries or municipal cultural departments. Nevertheless, research on earned income of GLAMs is very limited and scattered, mostly discussed in single case studies of individual organisations. For now, there is no comparable data within and across the different domains in GLAMs to understand to what degree cultural organisations rely on earned income. As GLAMs rely on visitors, earned incomes have decreased significantly during the pandemic.

3.1.4. Financial Instruments

The term financial instruments covers a variety of financial products that are all intended to be repayable (FINCH, 2020, p. 26) and are either based on debt (a sum of money is lend for an agreed period of time) or equity (investment for partial or total ownership of the firm). These financial instruments can be provided by a “traditional financial institution, a microcredit provider, a business angel, a venture capitalist, an individual (the so-called ‘family, friends, fans and fools’ - the 4Fs), or even the government” (OECD, 2022, p. 239). Most often they are used now in economic development programs, as in the European Structural and Investment Funds (FINCH, 2020, p. 28) and in conceiving new support instruments for growth of cultural and creative industries (OECD, 2022). While debt-based instruments such as subsidized loans and guarantees are used quite often for GLAMs (e.g., for capital projects), equity-types of instruments such as seed capital and growth capital are not yet described in the literature.

3.1.5. Overview types of funding and financial instruments

	Self-finance	Public support	Debt finance	Equity finance	Other
Instrument	Personal resources Earned income	Subsidies Grants Tax Incentives	Loans Micro-credit Overdraft Guarantees	Venture capital	Donation Sponsorship Patronage Crowdfunding Friends & memberships

⁶ “Tate’s collecting has historically been funded by a grant provided by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. In more recent years, Tate has developed a number of further funding streams to sustain our collecting activity independently to our grant-in-aid. This activity is now almost entirely funded through philanthropy and self-generated income.” (Tate, 2023)

Who	Proprietor, family friends	& Public authorities and agencies	Banks	Business angels, Venture capital	People, companies, foundations, trusts
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Table 3: Different types of funding and financial instruments, based on OECD (2022, p. 230) with own additions.

3.2. Differences across GLAMs

GLAMs are diverse in size, ownership structure, including non-for-profit and for-profit organisations, governance structure, purpose, and participatory approaches. Yet as heritage organisations they all serve public functions and have wide-ranging financial needs for personal costs, programming and often the maintenance of buildings. In most EU member states GLAMs are still mainly publicly funded and public authorities “remain essential for the safeguarding and promotion of cultural heritage” (European Commission, 2021a, p. 4). While the term GLAM signifies that these institutions are collecting institutions that share important characteristics, there are also differences between the four domains that influence their potential for diversifying their financial sources and their dependency on public support. What is apparent is that for all four domains there exists only a very limited understanding on the financial sources and funding models for the various types of organisations in the sector. Our mapping showed that while there is good data on public cultural spending, there is hardly any on private funding, earned income or lottery contributions available to understand the new mixed economy of these organisations and their financial needs. Moreover, to date, there is no comprehensive understanding of the funding situation on the different governmental levels or on the EU level that would enable comparisons within and across the domains. Also, more specifically, there is very limited literature that investigates the situation of small, independent, and often volunteer-based GLAMs in the community heritage sector (Cantillon & Baker, 2022). Moreover, while there is a growing social interest in museums and libraries and their cultural, economic, and social functions, archives and galleries have not enjoyed such a policy focus and interest by scholars. Understanding the financial structure of GLAMs is crucial as it influences their longevity as well as their goals, strategies and mission and, thus, their ability to “perform the many and varied functions expected of them by society” (Woodward, 2012, p. 15) – especially, as GLAMs have undergone “seismic shifts in the form, function and public valuation” (ibid.) over the last three decades.

3.2.1. Galleries

Within the GLAM concept, the ‘G’ stands for the public and private art galleries and art museums that collect and display their collections to the public while commercial galleries do not belong to the cultural heritage

sector and are not included. Especially private art galleries, where art collectors open their collections to the public, have been on the rise since 2000 (Kolbe et al., 2022).

Public art galleries can be found on all governmental levels from municipal art galleries towards national art galleries. Most are still governed through their respective cultural ministries, cities or regions through contracts that specify the museums' responsibilities (Kwok & Garlandini, 2019). However, many have been made operationally independent but still receive their funding from governmental sources. In terms of the funding situation, very little is known. For example, the Hamburger Kunsthalle is Hamburg's art gallery and receives 70 percent public funding and earns 30 percent through ticket sales and membership fees (Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2021).⁷

3.2.2. Libraries

Libraries have seen a growing interest by governments as well as researchers over the last decade due to their role in the information society and as critical social infrastructures in communities and cities (Mattern, 2014). Again, libraries exist in various institutional forms. With their physical collections libraries have enormous fix costs but literature and data on income generation and financial flows are rare (Ghalavand et al., 2022). Moreover, "The literature on income generation methods is dominated by US-American writers (Pautz, 2014) which signifies a greater concern with income generation in the US-context than in European debates and the majority of studies focusing in academic libraries (Ghalavand et al., 2022, p. 6). While libraries often receive their main income from public sources and the support through parent organisations (e.g., for academic libraries), they have specific opportunities for income generation through fees (i.e., photocopy earnings, overdue book fines, sales of facsimiles and publications, and special item rental fees (Pautz, 2014)) and charges for their information services (searching databases, consulting services), for providing services (e.g., holding archives for others), educational and training activities and hosting and offering welfare services (Ghalavand et al., 2022). Also, increasingly, they earn from non-specialized services such as renting parts of the library out to bookstores, stationery sales or for events. However, many academic libraries often do not benefit from their income generation activities, as income is pooled centrally and re-distributed across the university. The same applies to municipal public libraries whose additional income usually must go into municipalities' central budgets. Additionally, libraries have private contributions in forms

⁷ Annual Reports of individual organisations provide a good overview of funding streams. For example, in Germany Annual Reports are not mandatory but the overview can usually be found in protocols auf parliamentary meetings, at least for institutions that have received public funding. Municipal galleries will be a specific focus in the empirical research in WP 2.1.

if membership, sponsorship, and grants from lottery funds and spend more resources on fundraising (Ghalavand et al., 2022).

3.2.3. Archives

Archives exist in various institutional forms from national public archives to university and company archives to community-based counter-archives as part of an archiving spectrum (Moore, 2016). While for national archives some countries keep updated databases (such as Germany, see DESTATIS, 2017), there is hardly any data available for the different types of archives and very limited knowledge on the financial sources and funding models for community-based archives (Bastian & Flinn, 2019; Moore, 2016).⁸

- The European Digital Treasures research project recently conducted a survey among 21 countries and received 42 answers from archives that have either been publicly owned or were autonomous but publicly funded (Digital Treasures, 2020). 92% of the budgets come from public funds and around 6,5% are from private contributions (2,16%), E.U. funding/grants (2,18%) and user fees (2,06%). The remaining income emerges from the sales of merchandising products, licensing rights or any other sources are all of them quite irrelevant (p. 7). The study detects a difference between national and local/regional archives a stronger dependency on public funding (over 95% of their budget), and no income at all from E.U. funds, almost no private contributions (0,07%) and, in proportion, slightly more incomes from their users (3,14%), while the National Archives manage to get almost 4% of their budget from private sources (3,88%) or E.U. projects (3,98%), and would generate an average of only 1,18% of their budget through fees charged to their users (Digital Treasures, 2020, pp. 12-14). The study also gave some insights into the relative importance of those different fundings. For example, for those organisations that received EU grants, they can represent between 2,5% and up to 30% of their total annual budget while users' fees as earned income can represent between 1-2% and up to 25% of the annual budget.
- A study on the situation of archives in the UK (Ray et al., 2013) showed that most archives rely on the parent organisation “for either the whole or the majority of their funding” (p.183) - parent organisations might be companies, universities, cities etc. Beyond nongovernmental funding, fundraising is important too and more specifically grants from the Lottery.
- For the US-context, a recent study (Bergis, 2019) found that community-based archives generate revenue from earned income, donations, and grants from local municipalities and funding organisation and rely on the local community for financial support. Yet they are mostly sustained through volunteering. The main problem remains the lack of access to

⁸ In the German statistical report on archives it is acknowledged that “there is no data for most types of archives” (DESTATIS, 2017, p. 72).

funding that can contribute significantly to their operations, collections care and programming, and their ability to plan for long-term capacity building efforts and sustainability. For the US-context “money, labor, and time are always identified as the main barriers to progress, whether it’s for keeping the building open, hiring staff, maintaining, and growing the collections, doing preservation or outreach, or providing broader access to materials.” (Bergis, 2018).

While the data remains inconclusive and scattered, there is a clear need to work more on collecting updated and comparable data on different types of archives.

3.2.4. Museums

Museums are the most well-researched sector of the GLAMs with a vast literature in cultural economics and cultural policy research addressing the shifts in organisation, governance, audience development and financial support of museums. While many museums remain public and publicly funded, they are increasingly hybrids, neither private nor public due to the privatization policies over the last decades (Schuster, 1998). And despite a growth in private museums, there is very little research and little agreement on what makes a museum a private one – is it operation and governance, ownership and/ or funding (Kolbe et al., 2022). Nevertheless, for example in Germany more than half of the 6700 museums are public, with the overwhelming majority being municipal while the majority of private museums is run by associations and only four percent are hybrid (DESTATIS, 2017, p. 23). There is also a growth in grassroots initiatives of ecomuseums (Davis, 2011) and community museums (Moreno, 2004), that challenge traditional museology as they aim for a new interpretation of tangible and intangible heritage, greater community involvement and participation in the life of a museum (Kwok & Garlandini, 2019). Their focus is on local cultural and natural heritage and on the sustainable development of their communities. However, the research literature is comparatively small for the European context. Museum financing is based on a mixture of incomes (Hutter, 1998; Lindqvist, 2012; Woodward, 2012) including traditional subsidies and public grants, self-generated revenue from ticketing and educational services, and private contributions. While there is much focus on understanding the influence of sponsorship and corporate donations on museums (Camarero et al., 2023; Camarero et al., 2011), the literature on self-generated income is still scant. For example, Romolini et al. (2020) finds that in Italy museums self-generate 35,5 % of their income while Pauget et al. (2021) find that museums in France self-generate less than 20% of their income.

3.3. General Trends in Cultural Funding in EU-27 countries

As the previous discussion shows, for most GLAMs, the public sector funding still plays a significant role and constitutes their main funding source. Thus, they are dependent on cultural policy developments and the allocation of public funding as “the most direct demonstration of cultural policy directives” (Katz-Gerro, 2015, p. 1). This section will briefly highlight several long-term trends in cultural spending that shape the situation of GLAMs in EU member states. Zooming on central cultural expenditure, the following broader trends can be identified:

- There is an **overall rise in cultural spending in EU-member states** since the financial crisis that precedes the emergency of the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in March 2020 (EUROSTAT, 2022).
- The overall rise is due to a significant **rise in local cultural spending** than in national cultural spending which has decreased in many Western member states (EUROSTAT, 2022; Inkei, 2019). Some countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal remain in 2021 still below their central government spending from 2009 for cultural services (EUROSTAT, 2022).
- There is an **East-West-divide** as developments are split between the 11 post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and the remaining 16 member states. Due to their absolute spending, the 16 western countries largely determine the common trend of the 27 countries (Inkei, 2019, pp. 9-14). Yet there is a noticeable rise in national and local cultural policy spending in the Eastern countries with little decline of spending after 2008 in comparison to the West. States such as Hungary and Latvia spends more than 1 percent of their GDP on cultural services while most Western countries barely make 0,5 percent of their GDP, with Greece only making 0,1 percent of their national budget available for culture (Inkei, 2019, p. 10).

4. Current Challenges and transformations for GLAMs

The literature overview and the development of funding instruments for GLAMs demonstrate that the main contribution to most cultural organisations in continental Europe remains direct public funding. However, there have been significant shifts over the last decades and with the COVID-19 pandemic new challenges became more urgent. Moreover, GLAMs have undergone a “range of political, social, and cultural pressures to change, adapt, and modernize” (Brenton & Bouckaert, 2021, p. 717).

4.1. General challenges and transformation drivers of cultural policies

As Hylland et al. (2022, p. 4) argue: “there seem to be three major potential agents for transformations (including isomorphism) of national cultural policy: 1) international, regional, and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), such as UNESCO or the EU; 2) external shocks that destabilise entrenched institutions, traditions, and routines, such as the Covid-19 pandemic; and 3) technological change, including digitisation.” For now, it remains unclear what the long-term influence of the Covid-19 pandemic will be on cultural policies and on public funding for GLAMs across the EU-member states. However, it is highly likely that with the sharp increase in public debt many states will decrease their cultural funding (Betzler et al., 2020). But as most cultural policies are rather path-dependent and rooted in former policies and the history of their nations (Bell & Oakley, 2014; Zimmer & Toepler, 1999), there will be variation across the EU and in many states cultural policies will be shaped by ongoing transformations that evolved over the last decades. These transformations often happen gradually and incremental instead of a sudden shift and will be discussed next.

First, is the **reconstruction of the welfare state and the ongoing privatisation, marketisation, and introduction of New Public Management** as driving forces in culture policy. Many member states outsourced museums and galleries to become autonomous units with greater decision-making autonomy, could oversee their budget and keep earned income (Kwok & Garlandini, 2019). Since the 1980s neoliberalisation policies have shaped cultural policy and its attention to business profits from corporate support to the arts but also commercialisation (i.e., through gift shops). What was first framed as a charity approach later got reframed as a “win-win” situation, with cultural organisation becoming business partners then passive beneficiaries (Lewandowska, 2015).

Fundraising has gradually evolved as a strategic activity aimed at ensuring the sustainability of organisations with slow state withdrawal in cultural funding (Massi et al., 2019; Zimmer & Toepler, 1999). Also performance-based evaluations have been introduced as the new norm for

cultural organisations and results-based management styles were introduced with the rise of new public management (Belfiore, 2004; Loots, 2015). The economic crisis in 2008 and the subsequent public debt crisis in Europe was an important turning point as many public authorities in the EU began encouraging cultural institutions to diversify their sources of income by increasing their own resources and seeking private donors. Many governments started implementing favourable tax regimes to encourage patronage and philanthropy for arts and culture (Rubio-Arostegui & Villarroya, 2022). Bonet and Donato (2011) show that the financial and economic crisis had impacts on the governance and management in cultural institutions. A significant change was the emergence of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the involvement of private partners in the management and governance of cultural organisations (Badia et al., 2015). For example, Rubio-Arostegui and Villarroya (2022) observed for Spain an increase in corporate board appointments in state-owned cultural facilities as “a co-optive device in the quest for business funding” (p.376). Especially for cultural heritage, governments started to incentivize the private sector’s becoming involved and investing in cultural heritage through new financial instruments such as tax breaks, differentiated value-added tax (VAT) brackets, well-designed grants, loan programs and public-private partnership (P3) schemes (Boniotti, 2023; Thurley et al., 2015).

The second transformation process stems from decentralisation policies in many EU countries which gave sub-national, regional levels more weight in supporting arts and culture. These decentralisation can either be in the form of *devolution*, as the transfer of authority to sub-national bodies and actors with political autonomy, or as a *deconcentration* in transferring functions but not authority from the central government to other levels (Santagati et al., 2020). Examples for decentralization processes since the 2000s in the European Union are France, UK, Poland, and Italy (Murzyn-Kupisz, 2010; Santagati et al., 2020; Selwood, 2010). While many countries such as Germany, Spain and Switzerland always had strong regional policies due to their specific policy systems, for several countries the decentralisation meant significant shifts in funding, priorities, and duties. International organisations - especially the UNESCO and The Council of Europe’s Cultural Policy Review Programme - have also played an important role in the cultural policy decentralization (Renko et al., 2022; Vestheim, 2019).

As a result, about two-thirds of all public cultural expenditure in Europe takes place in regions and cities (Inkei, 2019).

The third transformation concerns the **hybridisation or désétatisation** of the three ideal-typical funding models in arts and culture (UK, US, Europe) whose boundaries have become blurred and increasingly render dichotomous categorization of public or private as insufficient (Rius-Ulldemolins, 2016; Rosenstein, 2010). For example, many museums started to implement a mixed model leading to a hybrid museum funding structure in Europe that combines public funding, private contributions, and self-

generated income (Camarero et al., 2011; Frey & Meier, 2006; Lindqvist, 2012; Loots et al., 2022; Romolini et al., 2020; Schuster, 1998). Moreover, several contemporary funding instruments combine aspects of a grant, a debt, and equity financing (Brabham, 2017).

Fourth, **economic austerity** was a reaction to the external shock of the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008 in many EU-member states that have significantly decreased their budgets in cultural services. Cultural organisations were forced to broaden their income base to secure funding. Moreover, a shift from direct support, as in the form of lump sum subsidies, to indirect support through tax regulations took place. For example, the reduction of VAT rates was an important instrument in supporting European CCI and the EU digital sector, and in increasing cultural consumption (p. 208). Tax reductions also affect GLAMs - for example, since 2022 reduced value added tax (VAT) are applied to imported works of art, collector's items, and antiques in the European Union.

Fifth, to increase private involvement in culture **partnerships, participatory approaches and co-creation** have been encouraged. Those partnerships have taken various forms of private involvement in culture and cross existing divides between profit/non-profit (Lewandowska, 2015; Wang & Holznagel, 2021). For example, the Faro Convention (The Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, 2005) highlights the need to involve society in defining and managing cultural heritage and thus emphasises to introduce participatory and co-creative processes (Rabbiosi, 2022).

Sixth, a recurrent theme in cultural policy research is the **convergence hypothesis**. It examines whether European cultural policy models converge and policies are becoming more similar or whether new specific models emerge, such a Southern European one (Rubio Arostegui & Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020). For example, Rius-Ulldemolins et al. (2019) document convergences in the aims that underpin cultural policy with explicit and similar social, regional, and economic goals being added to cultural policy throughout Europe. Yet there is no evidence that the more fundamental models of cultural policy would be converging.

Also Srakar et al. (2018) and Srakar and Vecco (2021) recently argued for more nuanced European typologies that highlights more fine-grained convergences across member states. Based on their indicator set they differentiate: (1) Eastern European group: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania; (2) Mediterranean group: Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal; (3) Western European (Liberal/Social-Democratic/Continental) group: The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Ireland, UK, Denmark, Finland, Sweden; (4) Outliers: Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Estonia, Slovenia, France, Belgium. However, continuing economic austerity, especially after the pandemic, will likely create again "a growing distance" between member states (Rubio Arostegui & Rius-Ulldemolins, 2020, p. 26).

The last transformative shift is mainly technological as **digitisation** has influenced almost every aspect of the cultural production chain and increasingly how GLAMs preserve their collections and open up their collections to audiences (Bakhshi & Throsby, 2012; Kulesz, 2015; Potts, 2014; Taormina & Baraldi, 2022). The Digital Agenda is one of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy. It defines the preservation of cultural heritage in Europe as one of the predominant key areas in the context of promoting innovation, economic growth and progress through better use of ICT and will assist GLAMs in their digital transformation (Europeana, 2020). However, as the pandemic made clear, many GLAMs have been only slowly embracing the digital transformation (Noehrer et al., 2021, see also WP 1.5 and WP 1.7). Two specific technological developments are highly influential on cultural production and cultural organisations—especially collecting heritage institutions with rich datasets of cultural artefacts—and will likely change financial channels of these institutions: **platformisation and artificial intelligence** (Kulesz, 2018; Poell et al., 2021). While funding platforms like Gitcoin have opened up crowd equity as a new source of funding for cultural heritage projects, they entail more fundamental shifts in cultural production. As Poell et al. (2021) point out in *Platforms and Cultural Production*, platforms bring about institutional changes in terms of infrastructures, markets and governance, but they also shift cultural practices and forms for creativity. This has significant democratic implications. Likewise recent research has shown that *artificial intelligence* has already entered the creative value-chain at every level from creation, production, dissemination to consumption (Caramiaux et al., 2019; Rindzevičiūtė, 2022).⁹ Yet policy makers are still reluctant to acknowledge both in their cultural policymaking. Here the pandemic has highlighted themes that have been long discussed in cultural policy development yet not been addressed comprehensively – above all the need for digitalisation on the side of organisations as well as of individual artists (Hylland, 2022). While supporting digitisation and digitalisation in the cultural sector has been a long-term policy goal for the past decade in the EU-27 cultural policy, the pandemic has accelerated the adoption of digital tool and platforms with artists and cultural organisations and cultural consumption via platforms (Vlassis, 2021). However, so far, no policy changes can be found in relation to digitalisation initiatives in cultural policies except for Spain (Hylland et al., 2022). The next section will discuss potential consequences from the pandemic on the financial sources of GLAMs in the EU.

⁹ The ongoing SAG-AFTRA strike of actors and writers in the US gives a glimpse into the changes that artificial intelligence might bring to the cultural sector. One of the main points of contention is the use of actors' faces and voices to create avatars that can be used over and over again while actors get paid a daily fee.

4.2. Cultural policy changes across the EU-27 member states

From our mapping across the 27 member states the following trends can be identified:

- The **Digitisation** of collections, especially for museums and archives, less so in regard to AI (see also working paper D1.7 on Copyright and open access for GLAMs in the age of COVID-19 from GLAMMONS)
- Most states aim to **increase private and civil society support** (e.g., in Austria, France, Denmark, Latvia, Romania, Spain or Sweden). In some states the specific encouragement of **public-private partnerships** has become an objective (e.g., in Greece and Portugal).
- In terms of new funding instruments, the Netherlands, France and Spain have embraced match-funding and crowdfunding in their policies.
- **Privatisation** as many GLAMs were transferred to new legal statuses, most often into foundations, to enable more autonomy in decision-making. For some states (), this privatization was accompanied with new laws on patronage and sponsorship.
- Many states still are in a process of **decentralisation** devolving responsibilities for culture and cultural institutions onto lower tiers of government, most often the local level.
- For some EU member states **providing more security for GLAMs** in terms of funding and long-term planning through creating new legal frameworks has been a priority (e.g., Finland and Hungary created new laws that guaranteed funding for certain organisations).
- Hungary and Ireland recently (2019/2020) started **investing again** in their GLAMs - Ireland had drastically reduced spending on culture in the aftermath of the financial crisis while Hungary started to focus on culture after a difficult transitions period under the objective of European integration.
- Noticeable is also that many states look more towards EU policies to align with EU-funding and have changed their objectives in line with the main European cultural policy principles as presented in *A New European Agenda for Culture of 2018* and the *Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022*, as they embrace more the social, economic, and international dimensions of culture in their policies. Especially in Greece, EU-funding has long played a crucial role to substitute for low cultural spending and has become even more important after the drastic economic austerity measures taken due to the European debt crisis 2009-2010 that saw huge local and central government spending cuts.
- The Czech Republic aimed for **modernisation** of its institutions.

What this overview shows is that while many member states start looking outwards with their GLAMs for audience and partner, many states are still very much concerned with internal institutional restructuring within their cultural policy systems.¹⁰

¹⁰ Information on the trends and developments for GLAMs can be found on the respective country profiles on the Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends (2023).

4.3. What happened during the COVID 19 pandemic?

GLAMs have been severely affected during the COVID-19 pandemic. Especially museums, libraries and galleries that live from public audiences have been hit hard through the extended closure with cancelled exhibitions, loss of staff, lack of income and the challenges of shifting activities and exhibitions online to enable remote access of audiences and community engagement (Habelsberger & Bhansing, 2021; ICOM, 2020; Tammaro, 2020). While bigger, national institutions mostly received generous support that helped to balance the loss of earned income and private contributions, smaller, less financially secure institutions had to improvise (Betzler et al., 2020; Prokúpek et al., 2022). As Table 4 shows, most EU member states have raised or maintained their pre-Covid cultural budget by the end of 2021. In Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Cyprus, Spain and Romania budget cuts can be seen already for cultural services.

TIME	2013	2016	2019	2021
European Union - 27 countries (from 2020)	57.246,8	58.377,8	67.320,7	71.159,5
Belgium	1.942,9	2.189,6	2.404,5	2.393,8
Bulgaria	189,8	219,0	263,9	329,9
Czechia	956,2	1.003,8	1.437,7	1.461,2
Denmark	1.729,7	1.867,5	1.755,4	2.041,7
Germany	10.896,0	11.777,0	13.636,0	15.486,0
Estonia	204,6	220,6	277,7	273,8
Ireland	595,3	695,9	772,4	814,9
Greece	248,0	243,0	266,0	311,0
Spain	4.525,0	4.851,0	5.775,0	5.476,0
France	16.689,0	15.397,0	17.070,0	18.000,0
Croatia	313,1	286,5	358,4	396,3
Italy	4.622,2	4.442,0	4.715,4	5.036,0
Cyprus	49,1	47,0	53,2	48,2
Latvia	270,2	244,8	302,3	347,1
Lithuania	194,9	264,1	360,0	396,9
Luxembourg	222,0	265,2	338,5	362,4
Hungary	773,5	1.116,6	1.667,9	1.562,0
Malta	50,5	74,6	92,1	127,6
Netherlands	3.103,0	3.374,0	3.925,0	4.213,0
Austria	1.842,3	1.920,2	2.117,9	2.073,2
Poland	2.485,1	2.640,8	3.887,8	3.280,8
Portugal	540,4	473,9	574,6	664,8
Romania	565,1	625,9	843,9	796,8
Slovenia	283,4	264,8	310,1	367,2
Slovakia	425,4	348,3	526,6	475,8
Finland	1.083,0	1.111,0	1.167,0	1.349,0
Sweden	2.447,2	2.413,7	2.421,4	3.074,0

Table 4: Development general government spending on Culture in EU-27 Member states based on EUROSTAT data for cultural services in Million Euro

For now, there is no evidence that the pandemic “has affected the essential political tools, divisions of labour, or core legitimation and goals of cultural policies in EU member states” (Hylland et al., 2022). On the contrary, it seems to have underlined the resilience and the stability of existing cultural policies and to highlight and partially fortify existing cultural policy structures (Hylland et al., 2022). There were hardly any new policies, and the financial support often came without any strings attached. During the pandemic, governments missed an opportunity to nudge and pursue long-term policy goals such as diversity, participation, and digitalisation with their emergency fundings. However, the support for the cultural sector took the “shape of economic policy, fiscal policy, and labour market policy” and underlined “the entrepreneurial and business side to cultural policies” (Hylland et al., 2022, p. 9). In most EU member states, there was “a combination of general (e.g., for all small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs)), sector-specific (for cultural producers/CCI) and sub-sector-specific (for e.g., film production, music industry, or museums) economic measures being implemented” (Hylland et al., 2022, p. 8). The financial measures were mainly income support and unemployment schemes for workers and for organisations structural funds and grants, loans and loan guarantees as well as exemptions, postponements and referral of obligations, extensions and referrals of pre-existing measures, fiscal measures, and debt contract relief (for a detailed overview by country see Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023b; Hylland et al., 2022; Lamonica & Isernia, 2021).

4.4. Consequences of the COVID 19 pandemic for public spending on culture

After governments have invested significantly more into the cultural sector during the pandemic, it is expected that the repercussions from the governmental support to arts and culture during the pandemic will have long-lasting effects on the cultural sector. Especially public spending is expected to decrease over the next decade, with local and regional levels of governments mostly likely being affected the most, as cultural services are often voluntary on this governmental levels (Salvador et al., 2021). However, how the pandemic will affect the financial streams of GLAMs remains uncertain and an empirical question for now. While several governments already announced budget cuts on different governmental levels, others have not changed their financial support yet (Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023b). For example, the OECD recently argued:

„The financing landscape for CCS in the post-COVID recovery period remains uncertain. While the 2008 global financial crisis was a catalyst for a reduction in government support for CCS, it remains to be seen to what extent an analogous situation will emerge in the aftermath of the global pandemic. In the light of a

growing acknowledgement of the importance of CCS for regional and national growth, many governments have labelled CCS as strategic growth sectors in their recovery plans. However, this does not necessarily mean more public spending on arts and culture and could in fact mark a further shift towards more market-oriented sustainability models.“ (OECD, 2022, p. 249)

The EU’s Council Work Plan for Culture 2023-2026 promotes a “recovery and resilience of the CCSI, by further strengthening their ability to respond to future shocks” (European Parliament, 2022) and aims to trigger a paradigm shift enabling the cultural and creative sectors (CCS) to adapt to a new normality after the pandemic and develop resilience in the face of possible challenges ahead. However, as the resolution acknowledges, the parliament is “deeply worried that the Creative Europe programme is still significantly underfinanced in terms of achieving its objectives and that any annual budget cuts to the programme will seriously harm the recovery of the CCSI; insists, therefore, on the need to ensure an adequate level of financing of Creative Europe through a forthcoming revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF)” (European Parliament, 2022).

Numbers from Eurostat until 2021 show, however, that central, state, and local expenditure on ‘cultural service’ in the EU-27 countries is not lower than before the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, potential budget cuts cannot yet be seen in current statistical data for the national level.

From previous research on the effects of external shocks on cultural policies, such as the financial crisis and the subsequent public debt crisis in Europe, we know that these drastic budget cuts have severe impacts, for example:

- In the UK more than 800 libraries have closed since 2010, a fifth of all libraries (Busby, 2019) and at least 64 museums. Also, many GLAMs privatised their staff and outsourced cleaners, porters and repair workers, or they fired staff and replaced them through volunteers (Rex & Campbell, 2022).
- Reductions in grant funding for GLAMs usually have deleterious effects for their community development-oriented work, as the developments in the UK exemplify where “participatory organisations were hit hardest in cuts in arts funding levels from 2010” (Jancovich, 2017, p. 116; Rimmer, 2018).
- Bagwell et al. (2015) show in their study on UK heritage organisations that they managed to replace losses of public funding with grants from charities and trusts. However, among the organisations there was little appetite to consider alternatives to non-grant finance such as debt, equity, and alternatives such as crowdfunding or payments for ecosystem services. Thus, GLAMs rather look to private grant funding organisations than to develop new income strategies or open up to financial instruments.

- However, especially banking foundations, who play a huge role in Italy and Spain have massively cut down on donations after the economic crisis (Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023c).
- Alexander (1996) has shown that when museums become increasingly supported by institutional funders rather than individual philanthropists in the US, they become more attuned to audiences, exhibits, and educational programs. Thus, when charities and trust get involved, they exert more influence on museums practices than individual donors.
- Large institutions, museums in particular, are in a better position to experiment with new ways of generating income or with innovation (Camarero et al., 2011; Prokúpek et al., 2022). This leaves out smaller, community-based organisations and their potential to generate new revenue sources.

Taken together, these studies help to develop our understanding of potential impacts, however so far there is little known about the differences within and across the GLAMs. The available research literature is either very focused on specific subsection in the GLAMs sector (e.g., academic libraries, participatory community archives) or very general (e.g., museums, libraries, archives, galleries). Also, there is very little comparative research and very little on differences between organisations that receive funding from national, regional, or municipal authorities and on spatial differences between more urban and more rural organisations or across the EU. However, what this literature review exemplifies is that GLAMs, especially smaller ones but also bigger, will have to look beyond private contributions in the form of sponsorship and donations to secure funding in the future. There is an urgent need to develop new funding approaches and instruments to sustain GLAMs and to reduce public sector dependence, yet those might not look towards the private sector but rather civil society and communities.

5. Alternative and Complementary Funding Instruments

For more than a decade, there have been political demands for the diversification and the engagement with more “innovative financial instruments” in cultural funding in the EU. (FINPIEMONTE, 2021). Especially the heritage sector is expected to develop new ways of funding, yet these debates and demands also extend to the broader field of culture and creative industries support (European Commission, 2021a). The characterisation innovative “refers to the set of instruments and schemes that are aimed to increase the volume of credit available to the actors of the cultural sector, and to facilitate their access beyond the mainstream private finance mechanisms (which can often be inaccessible).” (FINPIEMONTE, 2021, p. 16) Thus innovative refers to new funding sources that go beyond debt and equity-based finance mechanisms and can be either public or private. Yet, what are new financial instruments in the cultural field and how might they enable more sustainable funding models for GLAMS?

Loots et al. (2022) argue that: “Innovation in financing and funding appears to be more the result of new modalities (i.e., technology-driven) than of fundamental shifts in thoughts about how the cultural economy could be approached and how the CCI should be financially sustained.” (p.205). The following section will give an overview and focuses on three different groups of instruments that go beyond the mixed funding of public, private, and earned income:

- 1) Community-based financing, especially those enabled through new technologies,
- 2) New types of public-private-civic partnerships and
- 3) New developments in financial instruments.

Depending on their use, these instruments can either be complementary (and add to the funding mix) or alternative (replace the existing finding mix). These three groups of instruments have been chosen because they could enable commoning in existing as well as in newly created GLAMs. As “commons is a complex social system based on indirect social reciprocity” (Bollier & Conaty, 2015, p. 40) then financial practices are needed where an “individual’s contribution is not linked with a direct exchange of value with another, but rather on fair-share contributions to the larger collective that provide less quantifiable (and often unmeasurable) benefits over longer periods of time and to the community.” As commons necessitate a different understanding of ownership and property, they also need financial practices that can sustain the commoning process.

However, even though commons aim to be independent from market and state, they often have to rely on them to make ends meet (Thompson, 2015). Therefore, also new developments in financial instruments are considered

that might provide crucial seed money or help a community in their commoning efforts, for example to secure necessary premises or land.

5.1. Community-based Financing

While community-based financing is mainly discussed in the field of social economy, there is a long history of community-based financing models in arts and culture since the late 19th century with workers' associations and societies funding and running libraries, archives or theatres and creating new cultural institutions. Community-based financing helps raise the money where there is no access to traditional sources of financing, while also offering the opportunity for people to actively invest in projects they believe in, thus solidarity and cooperation are often central to this alternative financing (Meyer, 2020). There are various forms and instruments (Fuller & Jonas, 2003; Gibson-Graham, 2008): microfinance, Peer-to-peer lending, community investment trusts, community credit unions and crowdfunding.

5.1.1. Crowdfunding

Due to platform technologies, community-based financing has become scalable and is much better in addressing a wider demographics of people. In the 2nd Global Report on Alternative Finances The Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance shows that donation-based crowdfunding models have experienced exponential growth over the last decade and now account for 7 billion US Dollar globally in 2020 with an annual growth of 160% between 2019 and 2020 (Ziegler et al., 2021). Cultural crowdfunding represents a significant subset of this crowdfunding and broadens the reach of contributors significantly (Cicchello et al., 2022, p. 2). There is also an emerging literature in cultural policy research (De Voldere & Zeqo, 2017; Loots et al., 2023) and cultural economics on crowdfunding in arts and culture (Agrawal et al., 2015; Handke & Dalla Chiesa, 2022). However, crowdfunding is not just providing access to an alternative source of finance for artists and arts organisations, it can also have effects on the sector. As Handke and Dalla Chiesa (2022, p. 257) argue, that effects might be ambiguous on incentives for other investors, buyers, or donors, and thus influence the revenue mix of CCI.

The conditions differ across the CCI and between specific stakeholders within them, which is bound to affect the benefits of crowdfunding relative to other means of financing cultural production. Also, cultural crowdfunding has become more specific.

Most crowdfunding models in cultural production today are reward-based crowdfunding, offering a non-financial reward to donors in case of a successful campaigns, and All-or-Nothing which means they only receive the money they raised if the campaign hits their target (Handke & Dalla

Chiesa, 2022, p. 253). There are several globally operating crowdfunding platforms like *ArtistShare* (since 2001), *Indiegogo* (since 2008), *Kickstarter* (since 2009) and many more local ones (De Voldere & Zeqo, 2017)¹¹. An interesting case is *Patreon*, a subscription-based crowdfunding platform for creatives and their supporters that exists since 2013. In March 2022 they had more than 250.000 creators using the platform and more than 8 million active patrons from more than 200 countries. On Patreon user do not pay for a particular piece of art but to provide them with livelihood, to cover the costs of material, of an exhibition or execution of an artwork (Arditi, 2023; Regner, 2021).

A recent development is **civic crowdfunding or public patronage** involving citizens and public administrations organising fundraising campaigns for GLAMs. It differs from crowdfunding in that it is aimed at financing public services and works (Boniotti, 2023; Loots et al., 2023). And it implies a direct community involvement in the planning, development and implementation of the public intervention (Boniotti, 2023). Often the local administration is involved through *matching* a part of a project's target goal. That is, contributing a part of the requested sum - at the beginning, midway, or the end of the crowdfunding campaign (Loots et al., 2023). While crowdfunding has been used very little for cultural heritage, civic crowdfunding holds potential to change that as it is more locally focused. Examples for civic crowdfunding platforms in arts and culture:

- *Art Bonus* in Italy (Donelli et al., 2022)
- *Goatee* is a platform for civil crowdfunding “the commons” founded in 2011 by Platonic in Barcelona, a Catalan association of culture producers and software developers. *Goatee* helps citizen initiatives as well as social, cultural, and technological projects that produce open-source results and community benefits with crowdfunding. *Goatee* promotes transparency, open-source information, knowledge exchange and cooperation among citizen initiatives and public authorities.
- *Brickstarter* is a platform for crowdfunding and crowdsourcing architectural projects set up from the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra (Patti & Polyák, 2017).
- *Crowdfunding.gent* is the local crowdfunding platform of the city of Ghent, which started in 2015 and is intended for both profit and non-profit organisations (including individuals and non-profit organisations) looking for financing for their projects or campaigns.
- Newer initiatives like *CLR.FUND* or *GITCOIN* enable new kinds of instruments and matchmaking opportunities such as ‘quadratic funding’ (Buterin et al., 2019) which offers more democratic and scalable forms of matching funding for public goods.

¹¹ For example, De Voldere and Zeqo (2017) state that there are more than 600 crowdfunding platforms in Europe. And almost half of the campaigns in their period of investigation (2013-2016) initiated by a European project holder were hosted on global US-based platforms.

While crowdfunding is getting ever more popular and enables a much wider participation, it is important to acknowledge that this instrument collects only “relatively small amounts of money, and the participation of backers is limited to the funding phase” (Borin & Fantini, 2023, p. 2).

5.1.2. Match-funding

Match-funding has been the dominant mode of distributing government resources in the US cultural policy system since the 2nd world war (Schuster, 1989) while governments in Europe have been hesitant and only recently introduced match-funding in relation to crowdfunding projects (Loots, 2015).¹² The main rationales for match funding is to move private resources into unsupported areas that have societal benefit, and thus to enable a multiplication of limited resources (rhetoric of “increasing the available money to the arts”). Attracting “new” money is the goal. Often matching grants are used as an argument to raise overall budgets, for setting incentives to increase available money. Also, matching grants are less likely to crowd out private investments than a fixed-sum grant (Schuster, 1989, p. 6)

Match-funding in the present context is increasingly used as a method by which governments or (semi-) public funds become involved in supporting projects that seek funding via crowdfunding platforms. It results in public-private partnerships that pair creative ideas of individuals or groups with financial support from their backers, governments, and quasi-public institutions, facilitated by technology (Boniotti, 2023; Loots et al., 2023). Whereas crowdfunding is considered a method of online collaboration, match-funding is framed as a “collaborative funding mechanism” (Senabre & Morell, 2018, p. 5) in the realm of other systems such as “municipal participative budgets, social currencies, and digital time banks” (Senabre & Morell, 2018, p. 5). Cities and their local authorities were frontrunners in match-funding, soon followed by foundations, funds, and lotteries (ECN 2018). For example, *Goteo* in Spain and *KissKiss-Bank* in France were the first platforms experimenting with match-funding.

¹² For the US-context, Schuster (1989) distinguishes three different forms of matching grants: Co-financing has become the rule in US-cultural policy and is implemented by all state agencies. The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) can only support up to 50 percent of the cost of any project. The reason is that this was more widely accepted politically than 100 percent government funding, which was considered government control (Schuster, 1989, p. 2). Thus, non-profit get project funding, and no ongoing operation support, but must match it. It has become principle in all of EU funds (European Commission, 2021b). Challenge grants encourage arts organization to raise new funds beyond concrete projects, for every three to four new dollars the government gives one dollar in matching. And reverse matching grants where the private money comes first and then the government follows up with money (Schuster, 1989, p. 4).

5.1.3. Shared ownership models

Community shareholder and ownership models have recently gained scholarly attention in debates on community control of key assets such as energy, water and housing within the new municipalism movement (Russell et al., 2022). The emergence of community shareholder and ownership models can also be observed in arts and culture where local communities come together to cost-share infrastructures such as music venues, cinemas or archives and museums and to prevent them from closure (Ross, 2022). For example in the UK, Music Venue Properties is a Community Benefit Society that purchases freeholds of UK Grassroots Music Venues and rents them back to the operators at a fairer rate than their present landlord (MVP, 2023). The financial means for Music Venue Properties are raised through crowdfunding campaigns such as #Ownourvenues. Often these shared spaces emerge out of spatial struggles of artists and their occupations of neglected cultural institutions, with examples such as Ex Asilio in Naples, Macau in Milano, and Teatro Valle in Rome (Borchi, 2018; Strack, 2023). For shared ownership structures, there exists various organisational models such as co-ops, public-civic partnerships, community (land) trusts or cultural land trusts (Ross, 2020), non-profits and other types of common associations (Borchi, 2020). For GLAMS we can also see shared ownership models too.

5.2. Public-Private-Partnership (P3)

Over the last decades, collaborations and partnerships with private partners have become more common in the cultural sector. These partnerships can take many forms such as short-term contractual agreements (public-private collaboration) to long-term contracts where tasks and risks of public authorities are transferred to the private partner (public-private partnership) or as public-private joint venture where risks and tasks are shared between private and public shareholder. Especially in the fields of GLAMS, where for example museums have maintenance costs, public-private partnerships have become a much-used vehicle to reduce public expenditures and responsibilities (Bonet & Donato, 2011; Ponzini, 2010). However, the contributions and engagement of corporations is increasingly under scrutiny, especially as those partnership exclude the public.

5.2.1. Public-Private-People Partnership (P4)

The model of Public-private-people partnerships emerged out of the dissatisfaction with public-private-partnerships as they are often seen as mere project financing tool transfers (Boniotti, 2023) with little participation and integration of the interests and views of the general public. So, the model of Public-private-people partnerships integrate the participation of people, in the form of common citizens and the non-profit sector.

5.2.1. Public-Civic Partnership (PCP)

Another type of partnership that has recently gained interest is when “public authorities involve local citizens and/or civil society organisations in matters of mutual interest by actively sharing resources or decision-making powers” (Jerchel & Pape, 2022, p. 9). Berlin’s Haus der Statistik is currently a prominent example in urban development where the local borough formalized the partnership with different civil society organisations into a cooperative (Gundlach et al., 2022). In the field of cultural heritage there are already interesting examples: For example, with “The Third Sector Statute” from 2017, Italy allows mandates that social cooperatives can be entrusted with managing cultural heritage provided they are equipped with the competencies set forth within the service contract (Boniotti, 2023).

5.2.2. Common-Public Partnership (CPP)

Another type of partnership involves the co-ownership between appropriate state authorities (e.g., a local council or borough) and a Commoners Association (e.g., a cooperative), alongside co-combined governance with a third association of project specific relevant parties such as trade unions and relevant experts. This type of partnership emerged in debates around the New Municipalism (Russell et al., 2022) to enable local communities to self-developed and self-managed processes and structures in the neighbourhood and to claim co-ownership of the common project (Jerchel & Pape, 2022, p. 12). In lack of equitable funding for community heritage organisations this partnership model might be a solution to secure appropriate housing for collections (Cantillon & Baker, 2022).

5.2.3. Social Impact Bonds and Sustainability Bonds

Social Impact Bonds and sustainability bonds are an experimental public-private model where private sector investment is used to finance a social project (Galitopoulou & Noya, 2016). The project is delivered through a service provider, whereby if the project achieves certain pre-agreed results, which are measured by an independent evaluator, the government then pays the private investors (the service providers are paid by the investors through an intermediary and receive the funding regardless of outcome). If the project fails to achieve its contracted outcomes, investors lose, and the government (and the taxpayer) pays nothing. Social Impact Bonds is thus the “first mechanism combining a payment-by-result system based the achievement of social objectives while saving social costs for the public sector, private financing, and the outsourcing of social actions to non-public organisations” (Pendeven, 2019). There are significant advantages from the public funder perspective as this financing is very

outcome oriented and could be used for various types of short-term and more experimental projects in public service delivery (Potts, 2013). However it is not suitable for permanent financing for big institutions and the measurement of outcomes in the arts might be a problem to engage with this innovative public finance instrument (Belfiore & Bennett, 2007).

5.3. New developments in Financial Instruments

Financial instruments are characterized as “a contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity” (FINCH, 2020, p. 26).¹³ What characterizes the following instruments is that they provide funding that is intended to be repayable – either the funder/financier may receive interest (debt financing) or be remunerated in the form of shares that they may sell (or choose to hold) over time (equity financing). This funder/financier can be a traditional financial institution, a microcredit provider, a business angel, a venture capitalist, an individual (the so-called ‘family, friends, fans and fools’ – the 4Fs), or even the government.

5.3.1. Loans

Loans are widely used by public authorities to support all kinds of development. They are offered at lower than market interest rates, with longer repayment periods or the possibility of grace periods. When loans do not need to be repaid in the first years or with reduced collateral requirements; these are called soft loans. Loans are also comparatively easy to administer from a public administration perspective to the extent that the implementation of a loan fund can be outsourced. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has become important in providing investment loans, framework loans and funds (European Commission, 2021a). Especially the *InvestEU Fund* has become a main vehicle to enable organisation to access affordable debt financing for their projects (European Commission, 2021b, pp. 46-48).

5.3.2. Guarantees

Guarantees normally cover loans. They are essentially risk transfer and risk diversification mechanisms which guarantee repayment of part of the loan upon a default event. They are also widely used by public authorities to support all kinds of development. For example, the European Commission and the European Investment Fund have set up the Culture and Creative Sectors Guarantee Facility (CCS GF) to enable financial

¹³ The „[FINCH – Interreg \(2014-2020\)](#)“ research project gives a good overview of light financial instruments for private actors and public-private partnerships that will allow local and regional policymakers to move towards more sustainable models of capitalization of cultural heritage, and provides various good practices across Europe.

intermediaries to provide debt financing to SMEs operating in these sectors. The aim of these guarantees is to address the difficulties for culture organisations in accessing bank loans, and the limited spread of expertise among financial institutions in the area of financial analysis of cultural and creative SMEs and projects throughout the EU (European Commission, 2016). In Germany, the Fonds Soziokultur e.V. provides loss guarantees for projects (Fonds Soziokultur, 2020).

5.3.3. Equity

Equity describes the “provision of capital to a firm, invested directly or indirectly in return for total or partial ownership of that firm and where the equity investor may assume some management control of the firm and may share the firm’s profits” (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). The financial return depends on the growth and profitability of the business. It is earned through dividends and on the sale of the shares to another investor (‘exit’), or through an initial public offering (IPO). Equity finance occurs when firms exchange share capital in return for liquidity. This can include venture or risk capital and early-stage (seed and start-up funding). Equity finance in the cultural sector is much less common and is typically associated with risky high-tech ventures.

5.3.4. Revolving funds

Revolving funds are pools of capitals that are raised with the specific purpose to finance a particular set of activities or to support a particular group. The borrower is expected to repay the original sum that restocks the fund, from which the revenues are reinvested and can be made available multiple times. Revolving funds are structured with the aim to become self-sufficient and sustainable. The most common source of start-up capital for revolving funds is grant aid from local foundations, corporations or state or local government agencies. Especially in heritage management revolving funds have become an important new financial instrument. In Australia revolving funds are now used in relation to properties with cultural values, such as in heritage management (examples in Australia: *Heritage Works*, (Knaggs, 2015). Revolving funds for cultural heritage are therefore likely to be made up of both re-invested capital from the divestment of other funded properties; and donations mainly acquired through corporate sponsorship. For example, the Netherlands uses their *Culture+Entrepreneurship platform* (the knowledge centre for entrepreneurship in the cultural and creative sector) to launch a revolving fund called the *Gallery Loan*. It provides gallerists, who often face difficulties in getting loans at banks, with the possibility to take a loan of up to 40.000 EUR with 3 percent interest (Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023a).

5.3.5. Social Impact Investments (SII) and Venture Philanthropy

Social Impact Investments have been developed in the financing of the social economy as specific types of loan finance but are expected to become more common in the arts and cultural sector as well (Bakhshi, 2014). What characterizes these investments is that private funders or investors are not just interested in financial returns on their investment but also in social or ecological returns (Weber, 2016). The concept of impact investment captures these multiple values associated with the investment. It describes the provision of financial capital (equity, debt, or mezzanine) to support organisations in pursuing a social or ecological purpose for a limited time span with an entitlement of a financial return (such as dividend or interest payments). While the idea of investing money with social or ecological goals is nothing new (e.g., building societies and co-ops) and can be traced back for centuries, the idea of leveraging venture capital mechanisms for social purposes is indeed relatively new (Ludlow & Casebourne, 2012). An impact investment is usually accompanied by supportive management expertise for the organisational development of the investee, as already established within venture philanthropy. Unlike venture philanthropy, impact investing does require a non-negative financial return.

Over the past decade, many new financing tools have been created by social impact investing (SII) and are expected to facilitate the potential mobilization of massive amounts of new private capital for non-profits and social enterprises; the creation of new tools and asset classes for investors; and the adoption of a new paradigm that fuses impact with investment (Phillips & Johnson, 2021). What distinguishes social impact investments is the expectation that, in addition to a social return, the capital is repayable, and a financial return to the investor is possible. Social Impact investments are part of the so-called Venture philanthropy which describes entrepreneurial approaches to philanthropy (Gordon, 2014) where both financial and non-financial support are combined to create stronger 'investee' organisations so that they can increase their social impact (OECD, 2018). This specific approach can cover the entire spectrum of financial instruments (grants, debts, equity) and non-financial instruments (advice, coaching and business mentoring, access to networks, financial management, fundraising and income strategy, management). Schramade (2019, p. 7) summarizes the specific characteristics of social impact investments as:

- A dual return objective: pursue both financial and impact return;
- No charity: a financial return objective that ranges from capital preservation to returns at or above the market;
- Measurement: one should (at least try to) measure the non-financial (impact) return;
- Intentionality: the impact return is a goal of and condition for investment and continues to be a focus of attention during investment.

However, as research shows, there is a lack of readiness and “absorptive capacity” of non-profits, charities, and social enterprises, which comprise the majority of the investees (Phillips & Johnson, 2021) and many GLAMs shy away of this loan-based finance even though they might already have surpluses from box office and sponsorship or want to invest in a permanent building (Potts, 2013).

The first social impact investment fund created for the arts and cultural sector was the Arts Impact Fund UK (NESTA, 2023) in 2015. The fund was created and funded by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation and Nesta, supported by Arts Council England, the Cabinet Office and with additional funding from Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. It provides arts, cultural and heritage organisations with unsecured loans between £150,000 and £600,000. Between July 2015 and September 2019, the Arts Impact Fund committed £8.8 million across 27 enterprising arts organisations.

Building on the Arts Impact Fund, NESTA has already introduced two new funds: the Arts & Culture Impact Fund with an investment pool of £23 million and The Cultural Impact Development Fund with an investment pool of £3,5 million offers repayable finance between £25,000 and £150,000 to socially driven arts and cultural organisations and specifically answers the unmet demand for small-scale investment in the sector (NESTA, 2018).

Social impact funds can also operate place-based and focus on one particular city or region (Schramade, 2019). For example, the Social Impact Funds Rotterdam (SIFR) was created by the city of Rotterdam to stimulate investments in social entrepreneurs.

Social impact investments might be most interesting for more entrepreneurially oriented GLAMs that are not reliant on one big funding organisation but already combine many, want to grow and already build up surpluses or aim to acquire fixed assets, like buildings, that help them access bank finance (Potts, 2013). So far arts and culture play no role as a field for social impact investing in the EU (Mackevičiūtė et al., 2020), yet the examples from the UK and the more place-based initiatives in Rotterdam could provide inspiration.

6. Pan-European Mapping of financial channels of GLAMs

6.1. General Results of GLAMs from GLAMMONS Survey 2023

Out of the 223 responses in the survey, most organisations were museums (96), libraries (64), archives (28) and galleries (13) while 22 respondents identified as others (e.g., as non-profit art organisation, art schools, projects, cultural centres). This distribution roughly echoes the available literature and cultural policy focus: while there is a substantial body of research on museums and libraries, there is significantly less on archives and galleries. Noticeably only half or sometimes even less of the respondents in each category provided details, the other skipped questions on funding and income streams – a well-known fact in cultural policy research attributed to the fact that the person who filled out might not have been knowledgeable about the funding situation or because the organisations does not want to disclose this type of information. Most organisations in the sample were created after 1950: with 32 percent between 1950-1999 during the expansion of the welfare state in many European countries and with 22 percent after 2000 due to the rise in cultural regeneration initiatives and investments in cultural infrastructure.

Sources of Income (169 answers):

Most organisations (64 percent) receive more than 50 percent of their income from public subsidies. Only 13 percent receive less than 10 percent from public subsidies. For private contributions the distributions of answers are almost reversed: Only 13 percent receive more than 50 percent of their income through grants from foundations /trusts, donations and sponsoring from private businesses and lottery. In contrast, most organisations (55 percent) receives less than 10 percent from grants or donations in the private sectors. A fifth of organisations receives between 26-50 percent. For community funds, the overwhelming majority claims less than 10 percent while 7 percent of the organisations make more than 50 percent of their income through community contributions such as membership programs or friend's societies. For earned income, 21 percent make more than 50 percent of their income on their own. Most, however, make less than 10 percent. From alternative funds, such as crowdfunding, public-private-partnerships, commons-public-partnerships, matching funds, investment and loans from cultural funds or revolving funds, more than 77 percent make less than 10 percent of their income. Only 4 percent make more than 50 percent with alternative funds.




Figure 1: Sources of Income in 2019, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 12

Public contributions (126 answers):

For a finer grained analysis, we asked where public contributions come from. More than a third of the organisations (36 percent) receives direct public subsidies from national government (state), 32 percent from municipalities and only 15 percent from regional government. While 8 percent receive grants from public sources (including arts council other public funding bodies, EU structural funds or cultural funding).




Figure 2: Sources of Public Funding, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 13

Private contributions (85 answers):

With 46 percent almost half of the organisations private funding comes from donations and sponsorships by individuals and private corporations. And 19 percent come through grants from private foundations, trusts and NGOs. Only 13 percent come from international grant schemes from the EU or the World Bank and only one respondent states lottery grant. In terms of other fundings, respondents specified personal funds, banks, and EU projects.




Figure 3: Sources of Private Funding, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 14

Community-based contributions (74 answers):

Most of the community-based funding comes through membership schemes while 25 percent come through specific memberships from Friends’ societies and associations. For the category ‘Other’ with 28 percent, respondents note donations in kind, small fundraisers in local community or collaborations.




Figure 4: Community-based contributions, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 15

Earned income (104 answers):

With 42 percent, ticket sales are the most important source of earned income for the GLAMS in the survey. Income from fees (subscriptions, copying, usage) are the second most important source, followed by education programs, income from venue hires, café as well as the shop and publishing rights. For *other*, specified responses were paid services, rents from artists’ studio spaces above the gallery, the sale of art pieces and other types of events.




Figure 5: Sources of Earned Income, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 16

Alternative fundings (49 answers)

In regard to alternative fundings, and the least answered category with only 49 answers, a third of organisations reports that they do not have such sources while 28 percent receives funding through public-private partnerships and 8 percent from commons-public partnerships. While 18 percent have additional income from Investment and loans from cultural funds /revolving funds, only 8 percent report crowdfunding as an alternative source of funding.




Figure 6: Sources of Alternative Funding, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 17

Changes through the COVID-19 pandemic:

Most organisation reported a significant decrease in earned income (66%), community-based funding (56%), grants (46%), alternative funding (42%) and public funding (35%). However, some saw an increase in public funding (22%) while most reported no change (44%). And very few organisations reported an increase in community-based funding (11%), earned income (6%) and alternative funding (5%).




Figure 7: Changes in income streams during the COVID-19 pandemic, GLAMMONS Survey 2023, Questions 20

Despite a rather small and self-selective sample due to the online questionnaire several observations can be drawn from the dataset that need further investigation to strengthen the evidence base:

- For most organisations more than half of their income relies on national and local public and thus public support remains the main source of income for the organisations in the sample.
- Organisations experienced the biggest decrease with earned income with the loss of ticket sales—albeit not necessarily the biggest decrease in absolute money as for most the share of earned income in the overall funding architecture is around 23 percent of their overall income.
- The loss of earned income was compensated with increased public support from emergency packages. Yet still organisations report a greater loss of public funding than an increase during the pandemic—a result that might be due to late rescue packages from the central government.
- A third of the organisations already has contributions from the community, mainly through membership schemes and friends' associations. Six organisations generate more than 50 percent of their income through community-based funding.

These findings show that GLAMs rely on a funding mix of public support, private contributions and earned income, but it again underlines the relative importance of public funding for most. Alternative funding is already in use but to a much lesser degree. Only a third of the organisations in the sample have experiences with crowdfunding, public-private-partnerships, commons-public-partnerships, matching funds or investment and loans from cultural funds / revolving funds. There is more experience with community-based funding through memberships schemes and Friends' societies and associations.

6.2. Spatial differences across core and non-core regions (Survey)

A theme that runs through cultural policy literature and cultural economics is that *size* and *location* seem to play a decisive factor in how GLAMs are financed, yet there is little comparative research on those spatial differences and even inequalities. Eurostat data shows enormous differences between EU member states from the EU-West and EU-East in terms of funding. It is well-known fact that capitals often receive the biggest share in public and private contributions and have better options for earned income thanks to tourism. Yet again most cultural statistics do not give such detailed information on cultural spending in different spatial contexts. For example, the German cultural spending report (Kulturfinanzbericht) does include cultural spending for museums and

libraries according to city size. For example, in Germany the actual spending per capita on museums varies between 0,66 EUR in municipalities with less than 3000 inhabitants to 30,66 EUR in cities with more than 500.000 inhabitants. For libraries the spending patterns are similar: 0,89 EUR in small cities versus 39,26 EUR in big cities. Spending per capita has risen significantly and doubled for museums between 2005 and 2020, while for libraries it has only doubled in cities with more than 500.000 inhabitants (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2022, p. 87). Thus, to explore differences across spatial context we applied the urban-rural typology for NUTS 2 regions developed by De Beer et al. (2014, see also Deliverable 1.3. for the ESPON methodology) to the survey data. The data was aggregated to core and non-core regions: while urban areas represent the core region, intermediate and rural taken together become the category non-core.

What the comparison shows is that GLAMs in non-core regions experienced much greater decrease in all funding streams yet seem to have been able to substitute, compensate and develop new income streams as all their income streams have much higher “increased” during the pandemic than in core regions. This might be an indication for the agility and adaptivity of organisations in non-core regions that are already familiar with a wider funding ecosystem.




Figure 8: Changes in Funding Structure during the COVID-19 pandemic in core regions, GLAMMONS Survey 2023




Figure 9: Changes in Funding Structure during the COVID-19 pandemic in non-core regions, GLAMMONS Survey 2023

6.3. Conclusion

The available data sources give a good overview of the broad developments in cultural spending yet what is missing is the in-depth understanding of the “hybrid” funding models of cultural organizations that have developed over the last two decades. Therefore, we used the survey as a first step to gain a better overview of the diversification of income streams. It underlines that while for most of the organization in the GLAM sector public funding is still the most important income source, other types of funding have become important too, mainly in the form of donations and sponsoring as well as grants from private foundations. For earned income ticket sales were the most important source of income, exceeding income from cafés, licensing or renting. Also, community funds are gaining relevance for organization. Thus, more robust data sources are needed for better empirical data to enrich theoretical, conceptual but also policy debates on new financial sources for GLAMS. Given that public finance is a difficult area “where the production of systematic and accurate statistics presents big limitations” (KEA, 2015, p. 42), a bottom-up collection of data from cultural organisation should be facilitated in enabling self-reporting on certain indicators. For example, this self-reporting could be made mandatory when organisations receive public funding. And with suitable incentives, private organisations could also be encouraged to regularly report data as well. This would enable a timely and more comprehensive understanding of the diversity and the specific needs of organisations in the GLAM sector who are often private and community-based initiatives with limited resources. Such a data gathering could give the GLAM sector and its distinctive developments needs more visibility and voice in cultural policy debates. Moreover, as there are debates around the facilitation of “Open GLAMs” there need to be efforts to enable GLAMs to report crucial data on their financial situation to inform policymakers and enable more

effective policymaking. Especially in a time when most governments on the local, regional, or national level are threatening or cutting their cultural spending, such an approach is urgently needed. Otherwise, many GLAMS might not be able to sustain their programming, operations, and their ability to plan long-term for capacity building due to the lack of access to appropriate funding instruments. For example, for small organizations it is well-known that grants are helpful in hiring new staff and in developing new programming yet at the same time the application process, grant administration, and reporting requirements for these grants are so labour-intensive and beyond what most community-based organisations can do (see e.g., for archives Bergis, 2019). Moreover, it means that our understanding of GLAMs is mainly informed by a limited number of major cultural institutions while the majority of GLAMs that shape people's daily life are overlooked and not considered. For this research project we decided to focus on a qualitative research approach with data collection through information-rich cases studies that can provide insights on existing financial models in the GLAM sector, how funding can be used to enable spaces of commoning and what might be suitable financial structures and financial instruments to facilitate and sustain commoning practices in GLAMs.

7. Consequences for GLAMMONS Research

The state-of-the-art review in this working paper has important implications for our shared research in the GLAMMONS research project. While the aim of the GLAMMONS research is to explore the challenges of the GLAM sector (see deliverable 1.6) through the commons perspective, this state-of-the-art review had three guiding research questions: First, it aimed to understand whether economic crises and external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic have led to substantial changes in the financial structure of GLAMs. Second, it aimed to understand if changes in the financial structure of GLAMs led to changes in the organisations, such as new decision-making processes in the GLAMs. And third, it aimed to understand if financial practices enable commoning strategies within existing cultural institutions that are about reclaiming public cultural institutions (and not markets) for social uses and communal shareholding. The results of the literature review can be summarized as follows:

RQ 1: How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the financial structure of GLAMs?

The results of the GLAMMONS Survey point towards mixed results - while many have seen a decrease in public subsidies and grants, for many organisations their public funding remained the same and even increased, likely due to governments rescue packages during the pandemic and beyond (Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends, 2023b). The biggest changes in funding can be seen in the decrease of earned income, community-based funding, grants, and alternative funding. Therefore, organisations need to invest again resources in relationship building and audience development to rebuild their mixed funding. Research has shown that recent economic crisis had huge implications for GLAMs with turns towards more participation from private organisations as well as society and private funding from individuals as well as private institutions (charities and trusts but also companies). Especially private contributions made by donors and sponsors have opened GLAMS to new partnerships and gave new actors decision-making power. However, it remains inconclusive how cultural funding will develop after the pandemic crisis, except for the already visible cuts on the local and regional levels of government. While calls for fundraising from the private sector have been made after the financial and economic crisis there is now less political demands after the pandemic.

RQ 2: How can financial structures initiate change in GLAMs?

Changes in funding streams can positively or negatively impact GLAMs. Evidence from the museum sector shows that a rise in private partnerships and donations has led to changes in governance structures and programming. For example, private business partners became members of

advisory boards. However, it remains inconclusive to what degree new financial instruments also imply new governance mechanism as besides a few indications from the museum sector, there is no good empirical evidence yet for the GLAM sectors.

RQ 3: How can financial practices of GLAMs facilitate commoning?

It remains inconclusive how financial channels can become a mean to facilitate commoning practices in GLAMs. Current research on alternative funding very much focuses on private contributions and facilitating investments from businesses. Research on community-based financing models that go beyond crowdfunding is very limited, hardly existing. However, we assume that community-based financing models have enormous potentials for the emancipation of capital (and not as a replacement of governmental responsibilities onto communities) but also the democratisation of culture for GLAMs.

7.1. Commons-relevant financial instruments and commons-based alternative finances

The GLAMMONS research project follows a constructivist approach that understands commons as “socially constructed through specific collaborative organisational and institutional arrangements.” (Meyer, 2020, pp. 787-788). This understanding opens the possibility of institutionalizing various resources as commons and contests the essentialist approach that views only natural physical resources such as land, forests, fishing grounds or grazing areas as shared resources for commoning (Ostrom, 1990; Perilleux & Nyssens, 2017). Thus, commons can “take different forms that suggest different meanings of ‘commoning’” (Fournier, 2013, p. 440). Crucial, however, is the “understanding of the commons as a social process of production rather than as a means of resource allocation” (Fournier, 2013, pp. 442-443). This ‘practice turn’ (Euler et al., 2020) in commons research focus less on the resource than on the social practices of commoning and “acknowledges the reality of a commons as a dynamic, evolving social activity” (Bollier, 2020, p. 354).

“In practice, a commons consists not just of a resource, but of a community that manages a resource by devising its own rules, traditions, and values. All three are needed.” (Bollier, 2020, p. 354)

This also makes each common unique. Thus,

“... a commons arises whenever a given community decides that it wishes to manage a resource collectively, with an accent on fair access, use, and long-term sustainability.” (Bollier, 2020, p. 355)

To secure long-term sustainability all commons need resources to sustain the commoning - those can be gifts, donations, volunteer work or financial practices that support commons principles such as the indirect social

reciprocity. Thus, financial practices are understood as social practices because “money creates communities of users that can gather around shared values and purposes” (Dodd, 2014). And the question is, what type of financial practices enable commoning prosocial organizing (Peredo et al., 2018)? Ideally, commons are independent of markets and states and provide an alternative form of organizing and social production – however, the relationship is more ‘ambiguous’ (Caffentzis & Federici, 2014; De Angelis & Harvie, 2014) and often the state is needed for initial investments, grants or for using premises (Borchi, 2018; Thompson, 2015). For now, the research on commons-relevant financial instruments as well as on commons-based alternative finances is still scant – despite the relevance and urgency of the topic. As Bollier and Conaty (2015, p. 2) observe:

Financing for commons-based peer production is virtually non-existent. There are no coordinated efforts to bring together and expand alternative money and finance models. Nor is there any serious convergence of players or standing venues through which to develop a broader shared agenda for alternative finance, especially in ways that would assist co-operatives, commons, solidarity economy and other transition-oriented projects. (Bollier & Conaty, 2015, p. 2)

One of the major shortcomings of much propositional literature on the commons is that it ‘remains relatively fuzzy in its approach to the practical issues of constructing political and economic institutions and structures that might seriously challenge existing capitalist social relations’ (Cumbers, 2015: 62-63). This creates strategic blind spots in our thinking about ‘the institutional forms of ownership and governance that are most appropriate to a radical project of social transformation’ (Russell and Milburn, 2019: 2). (Russell et al., 2022)

So, how can commons sustain themselves and keep their independence in a financial system that is opposed shared ownerships? What are types of funding and financial support that are in line with the value and ethics of commoning? Bollier and Conaty (2015, p. 2) suggest there already do exist different alternative money, banking and finance systems that may be adapted to support commoning.

These include:

“...community development finance institutions, social and ethical lending banks, public banks, transition-oriented credit experiments, complementary currencies, blockchain technology (adapted from Bitcoin) to enable co-operative finance, crowdfunding support of projects, commons-based virtual banking as exemplified by Enspiral, and cooperatively managed value-chains for provisioning such as ones developed by the Solidarity Economy movement. With varying degrees of success (because they are embedded within larger capitalist structures), these projects are capable of providing capital, credit or new types of currencies to foster commons-based provisioning -- while trying to escape the familiar traps of capitalist lending and investment.” (Bollier & Conaty, 2015, p. 2)

Within our research field of GLAMs and cultural commons, there are two *modes of commoning* relevant to our research and to understand how different financial practices might enable commoning.

Commoning strategies within existing GLAMs: Here it is about imagining and creating shared resources within an existing institution and about reclaiming public cultural institutions for collective uses and communal shareholding. Practices of commoning are understood as “those discursive and material practices that not only counter forces of enclosure but that also produce a sense of place and community” (Firat, 2022, p. 1031). What funding practices can enable spaces of commoning in existing GLAMs? What ways of funding might open up concrete opportunities, new resources and initiate change (i.e., in relation to management and governance structures) for more commons oriented GLAMs that invite community contribution to the ‘core’ of GLAMs (Sanderhoff, 2014a)?

GLAMs created as commons (GLAMMONS): Within the field of GLAMs there are already many heritage organisations organizing and producing in common through a community of commoners (see deliverable 1.6). For example, many community-based participatory archives and museums organize and produce in common and thereby create community and solidarity through the sharing and co-creation of knowledge and common goods (Stevens et al., 2010; Zavala et al., 2017). Usually, the produced resources are then open to use by the public. “Understanding how commons [in cultural heritage] are created is therefore important to better define how they provide alternative ways of organizing” (Meyer, 2020, p. 789). So, the research question would be: How and what kind of funding practices sustain commoning of GLAMMONS and what characterises them? While there is little research on commons-based alternative finances (Bollier & Conaty, 2015), inspiration can be taken from the literature on social economy (Amin et al., 2002) and solidarity economy (Hosseini & Pearson, 2023) to understand suitable financial structures for GLAMMONS that facilitate and sustain commoning practices.

Most GLAMMONS might rely on membership funds and grants from governments, charitable trusts, foundations, and other institutions (Borchi, 2018). Financial instruments based on debt and equity might also be used to enhance long-term survival of GLAMMONS, yet there need to be adaptations, especially for equity-based instruments. Nevertheless, new types of crowd equity, co-operative capital and social impact investment might be suitable new financial practices for GLAMMONS.

7.2. Research gaps to be addressed in GLAMMONS

Instead of a conclusion, this research has highlighted the need for better empirical data to enrich theoretical, conceptual but also policy debates on new financial sources for GLAMs. As deliverable 1.6. states, we will study small independent organisations to understand how they sustain commoning. So, in relation to financial practices the research question will be directed towards understanding the ways in which cultural heritage organisations use financial sources to support the commoning process and to sustain themselves in the collective, self-organized production,

appropriation, and caring for cultural commons. And we also aim to understand how they remain independent of private and public institutions – or to be more precise make use of public and private resources to support commoning. Given the inconclusive state of research and the novelty of the commons perspective on GLAMS, we propose in-depth case studies and action research as suitable methodologies to examine instituting practices of commoning in GLAMs.

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